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Conventional wisdom presumes that a supplier in a monopolistic
market, or in an oligopolistic market that is not perfectly competitive, has
the power to charge a supra-competitive wholesale price. In contrast, this
Article, elaborating on recent economic studies, shows that the supplier of
an intermediate product may not be able to charge a supra-competitive
wholesale price. The reason is that the supplier has an incentive to grant a
marginal price concession to one buyer, at the expense of competing
buyers, in exchange for a fixed payment. The statutory ban on secondary-
line price discrimination helps the supplier commit to charging a supra-
competitive wholesale price. This Article, however, exposes how buyer
liability under this statutory ban erodes the effectiveness of the statute and
fuels the supplier's urge to make concessions. The Article further
demonstrates how vertical integration, tying and vertical restraints
(particularly imposing minimum or maximum resale prices, selling to a
sole buyer, designating exclusive territories to buyers, and using most-
favored-customer clauses) can be used to remove the supplier's incentive
to grant such concessions and thus restore the supplier's market power.
The result is an anticompetitive explanation for vertical integration and
vertical restraints that legal commentators, courts, and agencies have
neglected. The Article also reveals an anticompetitive explanation for
tying that the economics and legal literature and the case law have failed
to identify. Moreover, the Article fills gaps in the current economics
literature on maximum resale price maintenance by showing how
imposition of maximum resale prices is anticompetitive even when it does
not completely eliminate buyers' profits from sales. The Article
additionally demonstrates how the supplier's incentive to grant
concessions renders the "double marginalization " and "input
substitution" efficiencies of vertical integration less important than
conventionally thought. More antitrust concerns are raised when the
supplier is contractually bound to enforce minimum resale prices or
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exclusive dealerships. Even if these restraints do not bind the supplier to
enforce them, this Article, in contrast to recent economics literature,
reveals that these restraints are anticompetitive, as they aid the supplier in
developing a reputation for not making concessions.
Introduction ....................................................................................... 26
I. The Supplier's Commitment Paradox: A Challenge to the
Conventional W isdom ................................................................... 33
A. Why Does the Supplier Want To Make
C oncessions ? ........................................................................ 33
B. Competition Among Downstream Firms ............................... 36
1. Downstream Capacity Constraints ................................ 36
C . M ultiple Suppliers ................................................................. 37
D. Can the Supplier Develop a Reputation for Not
M aking Concessions? ............................................................ 37
1. Downstream Firms' Threats Might Not Be
C redib le ........................................................................ .39
2. Downstream Firm Retaliation Might Not
D eter the Supplier ......................................................... 40
E. Observability by Downstream Firms of
Concessions Given to their Competitors ............................... 41
II. Legal Im plications ....................................................................... 43
A. Secondary-Line Price Discrimination .................................... 43
B . Vertical Integration ............................................................... 46
1. The Reduced Importance of the "Double
Marginalization" and "Input Substitution"
Effi ciencies ................................................................... 52
C. Operation Through a Sole Outlet .......................................... 54
D. Minimum Resale'Price Maintenance and
Exclusive Territories ............................................................ 57
E. Maximum Resale Price Maintenance .................................... 61
F . Ty ing .................................................................................. ..63
G. Most-Favored-Customer Clauses .......................................... 67
H. The Commitment Paradox as a "Probability
R esult". ................................................................................ 69
C on clusion .......................................................................................... ..7 1
A pp en dix ............................................................................................ 72
Introduction
Legal scholars, courts, and economists have traditionally held that
suppliers are able to commit to setting prices for their products to
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maximize profits. They further assume that, if the supplier operates in a
market that is not perfectly competitive, the supplier possesses the power
to charge supra-competitive prices. A monopolistic supplier, for example,
is assumed to be able to charge a supra-competitive monopoly price for its
product. Even in a market with more than one, but only a few, firms (i.e.,
an oligopolistic market), conventional legal and economic analysis expects
that suppliers enjoy the power to charge supra-competitive prices.'
This conventional wisdom has brought with it overreaching policy
implications regarding vertical integration (i.e., where a supplier and buyer
are under joint control) and vertical restraints (such as a determination of
the resale price the buyers are permitted to charge end consumers or the
designation of an exclusive territory to each buyer). If a monopolistic or
oligopolistic supplier has the power to charge a supra-competitive price
that maximizes its profits, it has consistently been argued that vertical
integration and vertical restraints involving this supplier are not
anticompetitive. The reason, according to the standard account, is that the
supplier can charge a supra-competitive wholesale price2 even without
integrating with one (or more) of its buyers and without imposing vertical
restraints upon its buyers. Thus, the supplier's anticompetitive market
power (i.e., the power to charge prices above its marginal cost)3 is
manifested either with or without vertical integration and vertical
restraints.
4
Many scholars have likewise claimed that tying (i.e., conditioning the
sale of one of the supplier's products upon the sale of another of the
supplier's products) is harmless as long as; it does not exclude the
supplier's competitors. These scholars base their claim on the assumption
that the supplier could exploit its market power even without tying. 5
This Article challenges the conventional wisdom. Elaborating on
recent economic studies, the Article shows that a supplier may not possess
the market power it was previously thought to possess. Furthermore, the
supplier can use vertical integration, various vertical restraints, and tying
to restore its market power.
The following example illustrates why suppliers may not possess the
market power they were traditionally thought to possess. Suppose a
monopolistic supplier of Barbie dolls 6 sells its Barbie dolls to two toy
I This conventional wisdom will be portrayed in more detail infra note 8 and
accompanying text and throughout Part II.
2 The term "wholesale price" is used for simplicity of exposition and refers to other forms
of marginal pricing (i.e., pricing per unit bought or sold). For example, it also refers to royalties that
buyers pay the supplier per unit sold to consumers.
3 The marginal cost is the cost of producing and supplying the marginal unit.
4 Particular examples illustrating this argument will be discussed infra Part II.
5 See infra Section 1l.F
6 For the sake of simplicity and emphasis, it is assumed that the supplier faces no
27
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retailers, Toys "R" Us and Costco. Toys "R" Us and Costco sell the Barbie
dolls to end consumers and compete with one another over these end
consumers.' Conventional economic and legal analysis has assumed that
the competition between the toy retailers does not affect the monopolistic
Barbie doll supplier's ability to charge high wholesale prices: Because
there are no competing suppliers, the monopolist can presumably set a
high wholesale price per Barbie doll (i.e., the monopoly wholesale price)
that maximizes its profits.'
But this standard analysis does not necessarily hold.9 To see why,
suppose that, despite the competition between the toy retailers, the retailers
are able to make profits from selling the Barbie dolls to end consumers.
That is, the toy retailers are able to sell each Barbie doll for more than its
marginal cost.' If the supplier attempts to charge the monopoly wholesale
price per Barbie doll (say, $10) the supplier and one of the toy retailers
might have an incentive to negotiate a secret deal." The supplier could
competition from other suppliers. We shall see in Section I.C that the substantive point made here is
similar in the case where competing manufacturers exist.
7 The analysis below also applies to other situations in which a supplier sells an
intermediate product, such as the case of the supplier of an input used to produce another product that
is then sold to end consumers. The analysis applies equally to cases with more than two stages in the
vertical chain. Thus, for example, the analysis and conclusions apply equally to a manufacturer selling
to wholesalers, who in turn sell to retailers.
8 Most economics literature dealing with vertical relations and vertical restraints makes this
assumption. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 169-203 (1988);
Michael L. Katz, Vertical Contractual Relationships, in I HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
655 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989); Frank Mathewson & Ralph A. Winter, An
Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints, 15 RAND J. ECON. 27 (1984); Janusz A. Ordover et al.,
Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 127 (1990); Martin K. Perry & Robert H.
Porter, Can Resale Price Maintenance and Franchise Fees Correct Sub-Optimal Levels of Retail
Service?, 8 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 115 (1990). In addition, legal analyses of vertical integration and
vertical restraints make the same assumption, either implicitly or explicitly. See infra Part I.
One notable exception is the "countervailing power" theory, which hinges on the possibility that
strong and large buyers may possess bargaining power that can countervail the monopolist supplier's
market power. See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 528 (3d ed. 1990). But the point here regarding the supplier's inability to
commit to a supra-competitive wholesale price is different, both analytically and with regard to the
factual assumptions on which it hinges. In particular, as will be revealed shortly, my point does not
depend on the buyers' being large or having any bargaining power whatsoever.
9 The economic studies that began questioning the conventional wisdom are Oliver Hart &
Jean Tirole, Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure, 1990 BROOKINGS PAPERS:
MICROECONOMICS 205; R. Preston McAfee & Marius Schwartz, Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical
Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 210 (1994); Daniel
P. O'Brien & Greg Shaffer, Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts, 23 RAND J. ECON. 299, 305
(1992).
10 This will occur, for example, if the local branches of Toys "R" Us and Costco are at
somewhat different locations. In such a case, each toy retailer can attract some consumers (those who
are nearest the toy retailer in question) even if the other toy retailer is selling for a somewhat lower
price. For a formal economic model illustrating this, see, for example, ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL.,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 395 (1995), and TIROLE, supra note 8, at 279-80. Pricing above marginal
cost is also predicted if, in the eyes of consumers, the toy retailers provide somewhat different services.
ld.
II Let us assume for now, as in O'Brien & Shaffer's model, that retailers are not aware of
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grant one of the retailers (say, Costco) a small wholesale price concession.
The concession will give Costco a competitive advantage over Toys "R"
Us, since Costco will now buy each Barbie doll for less. Costco can
therefore cut the retail price of its Barbie dolls and steal business away
from Toys "R" Us. Consequently, suppose Costco's expected profits from
sales are predicted to rise by $500, while Toys "R" Us's profits from sales
are expected to diminish. Thus, Costco would be willing to pay the
supplier a fixed payment of up to $500 in exchange for such a wholesale
price concession. 12 If the supplier's loss from the concession is below
$500, the supplier would agree to such a deal. As illustrated in Section L.A
below, this is often the case.
In fact, for any wholesale price the supplier aims to set that is above
the supplier's marginal cost of supplying the Barbie dolls, the supplier and
a toy retailer will be able to raise their joint profits by negotiating a small
wholesale price concession at the expense of the other toy retailer.
Accordingly, from the very beginning the wholesale price will be equal to
the supplier's marginal cost of supplying the Barbie dolls.
The supplier's difficulty in committing to charging its profit-
maximizing wholesale price will be referred to below as the "commitment
paradox." The supplier's commitment paradox dissipates its market power,
even in cases when the supplier enjoys a monopoly position or is an
oligopolist conventionally believed to possess market power. This
prediction has found support in recent experimental economic studies. 3
the wholesale prices their rivals paid. See O'Brien & Shaffer, supra note 9, at 229. As will be shown
infra Section L.E, however, the same qualitative results remain even when after closing the contract
with the supplier, retailers observe the wholesale prices their rivals paid.
12 The supplier might have a similar urge to grant Toys "R" Us a concession after Costco
has already received a concession, which would cause Costco to be suspicious of the supplier.
Arguably, this might stand in the way of granting Costco a concession in the first place, since Costco
might not agree to pay the supplier a fixed payment up front that would compensate the supplier for the
concession. McAfee & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 219, demonstrate, for example, that when each
retailer believes that the supplier is offering other retailers the same wholesale price as the supplier
offered it, the supplier will not want to negotiate concessions. However, in our example the supplier
and Costco can plausibly get around Costco's suspicion. For example, the supplier could agree to
receive the fixed payment only upon proof (say, with the help of an independent accounting firm or
third party examining Costco's invoices) that Costco indeed increased sales following the concession.
Such an arrangement would reassure Costco that the supplier will not grant Toys "R" Us a concession
that will make a mockery of Costco's cost advantage. The supplier, for its part, will also agree to the
delayed fixed payment if it is confident enough that the concession will indeed raise Costco's sales. As
shown infra Section ILA, buyer liability under the statutory prohibition of price discrimination makes
such arrangements easier to implement.
13 E.g., Stephen Martin et al., Vertical Foreclosure in Experimental Markets, 32 RAND J.
ECON. 466 (2001). In Martin et al.'s simulation, students majoring in economics played the roles of a
monopolistic supplier and two retailers. The results were striking. When the supplier's offers to the
retailers were secret, the supplier, in most cases, could not commit to producing the monopoly quantity
or charging the monopoly wholesale price. The supplier expanded output substantially and charged a
considerably lower wholesale price than the monopoly wholesale price. On the other hand, when
retailers were informed in advance what wholesale price their rival retailer was paying, or when the
supplier was vertically integrated into retail, the supplier could and did commit to supplying the
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The commitment paradox is beneficial to consumers, as it encourages
the supplier and retailers to cut prices. Moreover, by dissipating the
supplier's market power, the commitment paradox is welfare-enhancing,
as it helps remove the welfare distortions inherent in pricing above
marginal cost. On the other hand, suppliers would like to utilize practices
that eliminate the commitment paradox in order to restore their market
power and raise their profits.
14
The commitment paradox creates striking legal implications for a
whole array of antitrust policy issues. The statutory ban on secondary-line
price discrimination, included in Section l(a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act, 5  helps the supplier avoid the commitment paradox.' 6  The
commitment paradox implies not only that the ban on secondary-line price
discrimination is unwarranted, but also that in many cases, the statutory
intent behind the ban would have been fulfilled without the ban. Even
without the statutory prohibition, downstream firms' 7 might not have been
injured, since due to the commitment paradox, wholesale prices would
have been low for all downstream firms in the first place. However, this
Article exposes the fact that, counterintuitive as it may seem, buyer
liability under the statutory ban 8 erodes the effectiveness of the statute and
fuels the supplier's urge to make concessions.
Vertical integration also helps the supplier eliminate the commitment
paradox. 9 Moreover, the commonly cited "double marginalization"2 0 and
"input substitution ' 2 efficiencies of vertical integration turn out to be
much less important than previously thought.22 That is, due to the
monopoly quantity and charging the monopoly wholesale price.
14 This effect will be demonstrated in more detail through a simple example infra Section
I.A.
15 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000) ("It shall be unlawful ... to discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, . . .where the effect of such
discrimination may be ...to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who ...
knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination .... ").
16 See Daniel P. O'Brien & Greg Shaffer, The Welfare Effects of Forbidding Discriminatory
Discounts: A Secondary Line Analysis ofRobinson-Patman, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 296 (1994).
17 "Downstream firms" are those that buy an intermediate product and either resell the same
product (in the case of downstream retailers or wholesalers) or use it as an input in the production of a
new product.
18 Section 1(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act declares it unlawful for a buyer "knowingly to
induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited" by the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (2000).
19 See infra Section lI.B.
20 The double marginalization efficiency stems from the idea that, without vertical
integration, consumers suffer from two markups: The supplier charges a wholesale price above its
marginal cost, and downstream firms add their own markup. Vertical integration is conventionally
thought to eliminate the supplier's markup, since the supplier charges its downstream affiliate a
wholesale price equal to the supplier's marginal cost.
21 The input substitution efficiency refers to the case where downstream firms mix the
supplier's input with other inputs to produce a new product. It is claimed that without vertical
integration, if the supplier possesses market power, downstream firms will use an inefficiently low
proportion of the supplier's input.
22 When downstream firms do not compete, the "double marginalization" and "input
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commitment paradox, the anticompetitive effect of vertical integration is
stronger, and its efficiencies weaker, than conventionally thought.
Additionally, the commitment paradox implies that imposition of
minimum resale prices ("minimum rpm"), sole outlet, or exclusive
territory arrangements which contractually bind the supplier to enforce
them are potentially more anticompetitive than such schemes
unaccompanied by such a contractual obligation.23 However, the Article
reveals how restraints eliminating downstream competition can help
eliminate the commitment paradox even when the supplier is not
contractually bound to enforce them. Such restraints help the supplier
develop a reputation for not making concessions.24 Ironically, if these
arrangements involve efficiencies in distribution that induce the supplier to
enforce them, these efficiencies have anticompetitive side effects, which
may well outweigh the efficiencies. This result stands in contrast to recent
economics literature, which claims that the commitment paradox does not
justify a prohibition of restraints eliminating downstream competition
when the supplier is not contractually committed to enforcing them.25
Resale price ceilings imposed by the supplier on downstream firms
("maximum rpm") also might alleviate the commitment paradox. Recent
economics papers claim that maximum rpm, coupled with royalties that
eliminate downstream profits, can be used to resolve the commitment
paradox. 26 However, the supplier would rarely be willing or able to charge
such royalties. Still, once we acknowledge the supplier's prospects of
developing a reputation for not making concessions, even conventional
maximum rpm arrangements, which only reduce downstream profits and
do not eliminate them, might be anticompetitive. They aid the supplier in
developing a reputation for not making concessions by reducing the
supplier's short-term gain from granting a concession.27 This result does
not necessarily contradict State Oil Co. v. Khan,28 which held that
maximum rpm should be scrutinized under the rule of reason and is not
illegal per se as previous cases had held. It does, however, challenge the
idea the Supreme Court put forward in Khan that resale price ceilings
generally tend to reduce resale prices. 29 That is, due to the commitment
paradox, maximum rpm might cause resale prices to rise.
substitution" efficiencies are unimportant for other reasons. Although the commitment paradox does
not exist without downstream competition, in such cases the supplier generally would prefer to
eliminate its markup and share downstream profits through fixed franchise fees. See infra note 99.
23 Cindy R. Alexander & David Reiffen, Vertical Contracts as Strategic Commitments:
How Are They Enforced?, 4 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 623 (1995).
24 See infra Sections ll.C-D.
25 See Alexander & Reiffen, supra note 23.
26 Alexander & Reiffen, supra note 23, at 632-33; O'Brien & Shaffer, supra note 9, at 305.
27 See infra Section lI.E.
28 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
29 Id. at 15-19.
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This Article reveals a new anticompetitive explanation for tying
arrangements in which the supplier ties one product it sells to another
product it sells. Tying arrangements, or "tie-ins," can help the supplier
develop a reputation for not making concessions. In many cases, the
supplier will find it hard to develop a reputation for not granting
concessions with regard to one (or more) of its products due to the
product's characteristics. On the other hand, the supplier might find it
easier to develop a reputation for not making concessions in the sale of
other products it supplies. The supplier thus might possess "slack"
reputation ability with regard to these other products. If the supplier ties
the sale of the former kind of products with the sale of the latter kind, it
could extend its reputation for not making concessions to both types of
products.3 °
Another interesting implication of the commitment paradox concerns
"most-favored-customer" clauses that require a supplier who grants a
wholesale price concession to one downstream firm to grant a similar
wholesale price concession to competing downstream firms. Most-
favored-customer clauses can also eliminate the commitment paradox,
especially when coupled with practices that make wholesale price
concessions transparent to downstream firms, such as having an
independent accounting firm both audit the supplier's sales and report to
all downstream firms. 31 Accordingly, most-favored-customer clauses
might be anticompetitive too.
32
Notwithstanding the anticompetitive effects of vertical integration,
vertical restraints and tying focused upon in this Article, these practices
may include welfare-enhancing benefits. To the extent such benefits exist,
they should be weighed against their anticompetitive effects. The purpose
of the Article is not to argue for the per se illegality of these practices but
rather to illuminate an anticompetitive effect that legal scholars, courts,
and agencies have overlooked.
30 See infra Section II.F. In a different context, Bemheim & Whinston show that when two
competitors compete in more than one market, cartels between them might be easier to sustain. In
particular, if in one market, due to its characteristics, a cartel is easier to sustain than in the other
market, the firms can use "slack" ability to sustain the cartel in the first market in order to make a
cartel sustainable in the other market. See Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Multimarket
Contact and Collusive Behavior, 21 RAND J. ECON. 1,8-9 (1990).
31 In 1963 General Electric adopted such an auditing practice, coupled with a most-favored-
customer clause, arguably to help GE commit not to lower the prices of its goods in the future. See
TIROLE, supra note 8, at 85.
32 See infra Section II.G.
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1. The Supplier's Commitment Paradox: A Challenge to the
Conventional Wisdom
A. Why Does the Supplier Want To Make Concessions?
Let us return to the Barbie doll example portrayed in the introduction.
Recall that Costco would be willing to pay the Barbie doll supplier a fixed
payment of up to $500 for a small wholesale price concession, which
would enable Costco to steal business from Toys "R" Us.
For simplicity, suppose first, as do the economic models that first
identified the commitment paradox,33 that the Barbie doll supplier and the
toy retailers, Toys "R" Us and Costco, interact for only one period.3 4 The
supplier's loss from granting the concession is attributable to two factors.
First, the wholesale price which maximizes the supplier's profits from
sales is, by assumption, $10 per Barbie doll. If the supplier sells the Barbie
dolls for any price below $10 per unit, it must forgo some profits from
sales. Second, to the extent that Toys "R" Us's transfers to the supplier are
a function of its actual sales of Barbie dolls, Toys "R" Us's lost business
will translate into lower transfers from Toys "R" Us to the supplier.
Let us consider the first factor, namely the fact that the supplier loses
from lowering the wholesale price below the supplier's profit-maximizing
wholesale price. In O'Brien & Shaffer's formal model, using quite
reasonable assumptions, a small concession from the supplier to Costco
would have a negligible effect on the joint profits of the supplier and the
two retailers.3 5 Still, even a small concession may enable Costco to cut its
retail price and steal a considerable market share from Toys "R" Us.
As to the second factor contributing to the supplier's loss from the
concession, a concession would still be worthwhile for the supplier, even
in cases where toy retailers' transfers to the supplier are a function of their
actual sales. Suppose, in the example above, that Toys "R" Us's payments
to the supplier are a function of Toys "R" Us's actual sales. For instance,
Toys "R" Us's contract with the supplier could provide that Toys "R" Us
pay the supplier a fixed royalty for every Barbie doll Toys "R" Us
manages to sell. When Costco receives a wholesale price concession (or a
concession with regard to the royalty per unit Costco has to pay), cuts its
retail price, and steals business away from Toys "R" Us, Toys "R" Us will
33 See, e.g., O'Brien & Shaffer, supra note 9.
34 For example, suppose that Toys "R" Us and Costco sell Barbies only during Christmas,
and the supplier sells them a bulk quantity of Barbie dolls before Christmas. Our purpose here is to
ignore, for now, the supplier's ability to develop a reputation for not making concessions, which will
be considered infra Section .D.
35 See O'Brien & Shaffer, supra note 9, at 303. O'Brien & Shaffer's formal result is
illustrated in the Appendix.
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sell fewer Barbie dolls and consequently pay fewer royalties to the
supplier.36
However, O'Brien & Shaffer show in a formal model, using quite
general and reasonable assumptions, that even when the downstream
firms' transfers to the supplier are a function of their actual sales, the
commitment paradox still exists. 37 The intuition for their result, which is
demonstrated more formally in the Appendix, is as follows. As we have
seen, a small concession has a negligible effect on the joint profits of the
supplier and the retailers. Accordingly, in the above-mentioned example,
Toys "R" Us's loss from the concession equals $500 (which was assumed
to be Costco's gain from the concession). As long as Toys "R" Us makes
positive marginal profits from sales (i.e., Toys "R" Us's retail price
exceeds the sum of its marginal costs and its marginal transfers to the
supplier), the supplier does not internalize all of Toys "R" Us's losses
from the concession, and hence the supplier's loss from the concession is
less than $500. Since the supplier's loss from the concession is smaller
than Costco's gain, the concession will be negotiated.
Thus, what drives O'Brien & Shaffer's result is the assumption that
38retailers make positive marginal profits from sales. As can be shown, if
retailers do not make positive profits from sales, the commitment paradox
disappears. 9 Intuitively, if the injured retailer makes no profits from sales,
all the profits are transferred to the supplier. Therefore, it must be the case
that the supplier internalizes all the losses a concession to one retailer
caused rival retailers.
However, in practice it is highly unlikely that retailers do not make
positive profits from sales. First, a retailer making marginal losses on sales
(i.e., paying the supplier a marginal price exceeding the retail price net of
the retailer's own marginal cost) would probably stop selling. Second, it is
highly unlikely that retailers make zero profits from sales (i.e., the case
where marginal payments to the supplier equal the retail price net of retail
marginal costs). In practice, a retailer would not want to operate where it
36 See McAfee & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 220.
37 See O'Brien & Shaffer, supra note 9.
38 What matters is a retailer's marginal profits and not its total profits. If retailers pay the
supplier a fixed payment (e.g., a franchise fee) that is not a function of actual downstream sales, it
would not affect the analysis. Even if the fixed payment is large and leaves retailers with overall
losses, the commitment paradox would still exist as long as retailers, after "sinking" the fixed payment,
make profits from marginal sales. In fact, when retailers pay the supplier fixed fees that are not a
function of their actual sales, the commitment paradox is even stronger. After the supplier receives the
fixed fee, the supplier's desire to make concessions at the expense of the retailer that has paid the fixed
fee is more obvious than in the case discussed in the text, where retailers' transfers to the supplier are a
function of their actual sales.
39 A resale price ceiling imposed by the supplier should accompany royalties that eliminate
downstream profits from sales. Otherwise, retailers might charge arbitrarily high resale prices, since
they do not make profits from sales anyway. Thus price ceilings (maximum rpm), coupled with
royalties that eliminate downstream profits, might be anticompetitive. See infra Section II.E.
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expects to make zero profits from sales. Even if the supplier induces
retailers to operate in such situations, by giving them a fixed payment
(such as a slotting allowance, a "bonus," or the like), the supplier would
have to scrutinize carefully the behavior of these retailers by examining
how they promote the supplier's product, the shelf space they grant it, and
the services they provide. Without such close scrutiny, retailers will not
have an incentive to promote the supplier's product, since they make zero
marginal profits from selling it.40 Such close examination of retailers'
behavior is not always feasible, however.
Moreover, in order to charge retailers royalties that eliminate
downstream profits, the supplier needs to know the retailers' cost structure.
Royalties for any given quantity sold by retailers must be adjusted to equal
the resale price net of retailers' costs of reselling that particular quantity.
To assume suppliers possess that kind of information is unreasonable.
Indeed, many empirical studies and case studies show that downstream
firms in various industries make positive marginal profits from sales.4'
Therefore, the commitment paradox is potentially important in many
industries.
As O'Brien & Shaffer show in their formal model, illustrated in the
Appendix, the same intuition applies to any wholesale price the supplier
aims to set which is above the supplier's marginal cost of supplying the
Barbie dolls. For any such wholesale price, the supplier and a toy retailer
will be able to raise their joint profits by negotiating a small wholesale
price concession at the expense of the other toy retailer. According to this
40 One way the supplier could overcome this problem is by conditioning the fixed payment
it pays retailers upon retailers' reaching a pre-specified target of sales. However, the supplier might
have inferior information as to the level of demand downstream and as to what the appropriate target
would be.
41 See Patrick J. Kaufmann & Francine Lafontaine, Costs of Control: The Source of
Economic Rents for McDonald's Franchisees, 37 J.L. & ECON. 417 (1994) (finding downstream
profits from sales to exist in McDonald's franchises); Francine Lafontaine, Agency Theory and
Franchising: Some Empirical Results, 23 RAND J. ECON. 263 (1992) (showing that downstream firms
make positive profits in Business Format Franchising). See also Francine Lafontaine, How and Why
Do Franchisors Do What They Do: A Survey Report, in FRANCHISING: PASSPORT FOR GROWTH AND
WORLD OF OPPORTUNITY 18 (Patrick J. Kaufmann ed., 1992) (finding that 115 of 117 franchisors in
the survey either used fixed royalties or decreasing royalties that leave downstream firms with
considerable profits from sales); Francine Lafontaine & Kathryn L. Shaw, The Dynamics of Franchise
Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data, 107 J. POL. ECON. 1041 (1999) (using data from 3,625
franchising firms between the years 1980 and 1992, finding that royalty rates usually are constant over
time and have an average rate of only 6.4% of sales, again leaving franchisees with considerable
profits from sales); Kabir C. Sen, The Use of Initial Fees and Royalties in Business-tormat
Franchising, 14 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 175, 183 (1993) (examining a sample of 1046
franchises and finding the mean royalty rate to be only 5.36% and the maximum royalty rate to be
50%, meaning that all franchisees in his sample are left with considerable profits from sales); Richard
L. Smith II, Franchise Regulation: An Economic Analysis of State Restrictions on Automobile
Distribution, 25 J.L. & ECON. 125, 129 (1982) (finding downstream profits from sales to exist in car
dealerships).
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reasoning, the wholesale price from the very beginning will be equal to the
supplier's marginal cost of supplying the Barbie dolls.42
B. Competition Among Downstream Firms
In order for the supplier's commitment paradox to arise, the
downstream firms to which the supplier sells must compete with one
another. If downstream firms do not compete with one another, there is no
joint incentive on the part of the supplier and a downstream firm to
negotiate a wholesale price concession. In the above-mentioned example,
suppose Toys "R" Us and Costco did not compete with regard to Barbie
dolls, because one of them sells such dolls only to institutions and the
other sells them only to individuals or because the same firm owns them
both.43 None of the toy retailers will be induced to offer any fixed payment
or other type of transfer that would make a wholesale price concession
worthwhile to the supplier: There is no competing toy retailer from which
any of the toy retailers can steal business by lowering retail prices.
In such a case, if a toy retailer were to receive a wholesale price
concession, its profits would rise. But the toy retailer's increased profits
would not be at the expense of the other toy retailer, because the toy
retailers do not compete with regard to Barbies. The increased profits
would be purely at the expense of the supplier, which would be selling the
dolls for less than its profit-maximizing wholesale price. This is precisely
why the supplier will not agree to such a wholesale price concession.
Accordingly, when there is no competition among downstream firms, the
supplier does not face the commitment paradox.
I. Downstream Capacity Constraints
Even if downstream firms compete with one another, and one of those
firms receives a concession, that firm must have the capacity to serve all
the buyers that will flow to it when it cuts its retail price. Therefore, when
all downstream firms are capacity-constrained, the supplier is better able to
commit not to grant concessions. Consequently, the supplier might prefer
that its downstream buyers operate in smaller facilities, since their capacity
constraint would help the supplier resolve the commitment paradox.
42 The wholesale price will equal marginal cost from the beginning, since for every higher
wholesale price proposed during negotiation, the supplier and each retailer will always negotiate a
concession. In other words, any wholesale price above the supplier's marginal cost is not an
equilibrium price. Accordingly, while the profitability of concessions drives this equilibrium,
concessions do not occur in equilibrium.
43 The same result would arise where downstream prices are fixed, either by a regulatory
agency or by some form of cartel among the downstream firms. An effectively implemented vertical
restraint may also eliminate downstream competition. The latter will be discussed in Sections II.C-D.
36
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Interestingly, an empirical study of gasoline retailing finds that totally
independent gasoline retailers, with which the refiner experiences the least
control over retail prices, 44 have considerably less capacity than stations
that are subject to more scrutiny from the refiner. This result is consistent
with the point made above. The more control the refiner has over retail
prices, the weaker its commitment paradox, since the supplier could use its
control over retail prices to overcome the commitment paradox, by
eliminating downstream competition. When stations are independently
owned, and the refiner has less control over retail prices, the refiner could
still avoid the commitment paradox by making sure the independent
stations it works with are capacity-constrained.
C. Multiple Suppliers
The commitment paradox also may dissipate market power short of
monopoly power. For example, if the Barbie doll supplier from Section L.A
faces (imperfect) competition from a Cindy doll supplier, conventional
industrial organization analysis predicts that they both can charge prices
exceeding their marginal costs provided that consumers view Cindy dolls
as somewhat different from Barbie dolls. 45 If these suppliers sell through
toy retailers which are in competition with one another, however, the
suppliers may face the same commitment paradox faced by the
monopolistic Barbie doll supplier: They will be induced to grant one toy
retailer a concession at the expense of the other. Accordingly, the suppliers
may be compelled to charge wholesale prices well below their profit-
maximizing wholesale prices.
D. Can the Supplier Develop a Reputation for Not Making Concessions?
An obvious question arising from the preceding analysis is whether
the supplier can somehow avoid the commitment paradox by developing a
reputation for not making wholesale price concessions. If the Barbie doll
supplier succeeds in developing a credible reputation as one who never
grants wholesale price concessions, neither toy retailer would suspect that
the supplier would grant concessions to the other. In such a case, toy
44 Andrea Shepard, Contractual Form, Retail Price, and Asset Characteristics in Gasoline
Retailing, 24 RAND J. ECON. 58, 62 (1993).
45 A supplier facing few competitors is also conventionally expected to possess market
power if the location of its facility is important to downstream firms buying from it and is somewhat
separated from the locations of other suppliers' facilities. See, e.g., TIROLE, supra note 8, at 282-85.
Finally, if suppliers' facilities have constrained capacity, suppliers are again expected to have the
power to charge a price above their marginal costs. TIROLE, supra note 8, at 211. In the latter case,
however, suppliers do not face the commitment paradox, since they do not possess the capacity needed
to grant concessions and expand output.
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retailers will agree to pay the supplier the monopoly wholesale price at the
outset and will not try to negotiate concessions. In some industries, it may
be feasible to develop such a reputation.46 In many other industries,
however, such a reputation cannot be developed successfully.47 In
particular, two factors harm a supplier's prospects of developing such a
reputation. First, the reputation can be developed only if downstream
firms' threat of retaliation for a concession granted to a rival downstream
firm is credible, and that might not be the case. Second, even if credible,
such a threat might not suffice to deter the supplier from making
concessions. I shall discuss these two factors in detail in Subsections I.D. 1-
2 below.
The claim that suppliers might be able to develop a reputation for not
granting concessions resembles, in many respects, a claim that tacit cartels
among competitors might be stable due to competitors' fear of a price war.
Cartels among competing firms have been shown to be sometimes stable
even without communication among the firms and without the use of
practices that help firms commit not to undercut the cartel's price. 48 A firm
might be deterred from undercutting the cartel price (thereby developing a
"reputation" for not cheating the cartel) because it realizes its competitors
will retaliate and a price war will occur in future periods. Still, the threat of
a price war does not always deter a firm from cheating on the cartel. Firms
sometimes need to use practices that facilitate cartels in order for the cartel
to succeed.4 9
The point made in this Article is analogous. Suppliers might
sometimes resolve their commitment paradox via their reputation and
without using vertical integration, vertical restraints, or tying. In many
other cases, however, suppliers need vertical integration, vertical restraints,
or tying to resolve the commitment paradox, since without using these
practices, they will not be able to develop a credible reputation for not
making concessions. A number of scholars acknowledge practices
facilitating cartels to be anticompetitive in spite of the fact that cartels
sometimes are stable even without such practices.5 ° This Article similarly
argues that vertical integration, vertical restraints, and tying are
anticompetitive because they improve the prospects of the supplier's
resolving its commitment paradox.
46 See Michael Hardt, Market Foreclosure Without Vertical Integration, 47 ECON. LETTERS
423 (1995).
47 In their experimental study, although they allowed for repeated interaction between the
supplier and retailers, Martin et al. did not find evidence that such a reputation would likely be
developed. See Martin et al., supra note 13, at 479.
48 See TIROLE, supra note 8, at 240.
49 See id. at 241; SCHERER& ROSS, supra note 8, at 235-75.
50 See SCHERER & Ross, supra note 8, at 235-75; TIROLE, supra note 8, at 241; sources
cited infra note 150.
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1. Downstream Firms' Threats Might Not Be Credible
A reputation for not making concessions cannot be developed unless
the injured downstream firms can somehow retaliate in response to a
concession granted to their competitors. 5 If downstream firms cannot
threaten credibly to "punish" the supplier for granting concessions, it will
be very difficult for the supplier to commit credibly to not granting them.
After all, as we have seen, if the supplier attempts to charge a wholesale
price above its marginal cost, it can make a profit by granting a
concession.52
A threat of retaliation on the part of downstream firms will not always
be credible, however. First, retaliation might be too painful to the
retaliator. Suppose, in our example, the supplier grants Costco a
concession at the expense of Toys "R" Us. Suppose further that Toys "R"
Us finds out about the concession and wants to retaliate against the
supplier (say, by terminating its relationship with the supplier or preferring
the Cindy supplier). The supplier might offer Toys "R" Us an even greater
concession at Costco's expense. Toys "R" Us would then face a choice
between retaliating (causing harm not only to the supplier but also to itself)
and receiving an even greater concession from the supplier, which would
raise Toys "R" Us's profits. Toys "R" Us's incentive to choose the latter
course of action considerably weakens the credibility of its threat. Of
course, if downstream firms' threats of retaliation are not credible, the
supplier will not be deterred from granting concessions. Knowing this,
downstream firms will not agree to pay a supra-competitive wholesale
price at the outset. Second, if the supplier is dominant in its market, Toys
51 Such retaliation could take the form of terminating the relationship with the supplier,
buying less from the supplier and more from its competitors, granting the supplier less attractive shelf
space, and so on. Hardt assumes that, once downstream firms realize that the supplier has granted a
concession, they retaliate by agreeing to pay no more than the supplier's marginal cost in future
periods. See Hardt, supra note 46.
52 It might be asked whether strong retailers able to retaliate in such a manner could not be
able to force the supplier to charge them a wholesale price equal to the supplier's marginal cost in the
first place, not in response to the supplier's commitment paradox but simply in virtue of their
bargaining power. However, if the supplier charges all retailers a wholesale price above the supplier's
marginal costs, all retailers would be better off than if the supplier charged all of them a wholesale
price equal to the supplier's marginal costs. The reason is that the supplier would elect a wholesale
price that would induce retailers to charge higher retail prices that maximize the joint profits of
retailers and the supplier (as stated supra Section LA). The retailers need the supplier to inflate the
retail price indirectly because competition between them (and the illegality of retailer cartels) do not
allow them to do so themselves. When fixed fees can be transferred between retailers and the supplier,
retailers' bargaining power does not affect wholesale prices but rather affects these fixed fees, while, as
mentioned above, the wholesale price is elected to maximize the joint profits of retailers and the
supplier. Accordingly, even if retailers have some power to retaliate against the supplier when the
supplier grants a competing retailer a concession at their expense, it does not follow that retailers
would use this bargaining power to get a lower wholesale price in the first place.
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"R" Us may have very little leverage to harm the supplier in any way,
given its reliance on the supplier's business.
Third, Toys "R" Us might not be able to observe the concession to
Costco. In such a case, of course, Toys "R" Us cannot threaten to "punish"
the supplier, because it is unaware of the concession. Toys "R" Us may be
able to infer that Costco has received a concession from the fact that
Costco cut its resale price. Costco's price-cut could also be explained,
however, by other factors, such as a reduction in Costco's other costs or a
reduction in the demand for Costco's services. Furthermore, in more
complex cases than this one, where there are several stages in the vertical
chain, tracing a manufacturer's price concession that has been passed
down the vertical chain may be even more difficult. In cases where Toys
"R" Us is not certain if the supplier indeed granted a concession to Costco,
it would be hard for Toys "R" Us to retaliate credibly, since it would have
to retaliate every time Costco cuts its retail price regardless of the cause.
Retaliation in such a great number of cases would be harmful to Toys "R"
Us. Therefore, Toys "R" Us's threat of retaliation is less credible.
Finally, if there are several downstream firms, each may try to take a
"free ride" on the other downstream firms' efforts to discipline the
supplier. Since such acts of discipline often harm the punishing
downstream firm as well as the supplier, each downstream firm would
prefer that the other downstream firms discipline the supplier.5 3 Thus all
downstream firms might refrain from action, relying on others to act
instead.
2. Downstream Firm Retaliation Might Not Deter the Supplier
Even assuming downstream retaliation is credible, it might not suffice
to deter the supplier from granting concessions. First, even if downstream
firms can observe the supplier's concessions, they might observe them
only a considerable time after the concession was granted. In such a case
there is a considerable time lag between the concession and the retaliation
by injured downstream firms-a time lag in which the downstream firm
receiving the concession could steal a considerable amount of profits from
its rivals. Accordingly, the profits that can be made from the concession
may well outweigh the future losses due to retaliation.
Second, retaliation might not deter the supplier if the supplier and the
retaliating downstream firms do not expect to interact for a very long time.
In such cases retaliation is confined to a relatively short period and
therefore is more likely to be outweighed by the supplier's short-term
53 A downstream firm punishing the supplier suffers all the costs of such punishment but
shares the benefits with its downstream competitors.
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profits from granting a concession. For example, if demand for the product
is declining (as in some software or hardware products that become
obsolete after a certain period), the supplier's long-term loss from
downstream firms' retaliation is relatively small.
Third, in certain industries a big fraction of sales is concentrated in a
particular time of the year (e.g., toys at Christmas or Matzos at Passover).
During that particular time, a reputation for not making concessions is
particularly hard to develop, since a considerable amount of business can
be stolen from rival downstream firms during these periods. Retaliation by
injured downstream firms typically occurs later, during the periods in
which sales are lower, and therefore has less deterrent value.
Fourth, whether retaliation will deter the supplier depends on the
weight that the supplier places on future profits versus current profits. The
higher the interest rate, the less weight the supplier will place on future
profits, and the more it will value current profits. Accordingly, the
supplier's short-term profits from granting the concession may outweigh
its long-term loss from retaliation by downstream firms.
Also, the larger the downstream profits from sales, and the less the
supplier internalizes these profits, the larger is the supplier's short-term
gain from a concession.5 4 Accordingly, the larger the downstream profits
from sales, the harder it is for the supplier to develop a reputation for not
making concessions .55 Finally, if some of the downstream firms' orders are
large and infrequent, the short-term gains the supplier can make from a
concession in favor of these downstream firms are even more likely to
outweigh the long-term loss from retaliation.
E. Observability by Downstream Firms of Concessions Given to their
Competitors
In the toy retailing example, we assumed that concessions the supplier
granted to toy retailers are secret and that competing toy retailers cannot
observe them after they are given. This assumption simplified the analysis.
In the current Subsection, we shall examine the consequences of relaxing
this assumption. As will be shown, the supplier's inability to commit to
charging its profit-maximizing wholesale price may exist whether or not
downstream firms can observe concessions made in favor of their
competitors after the concessions have been given.56 Nevertheless, if
downstream firms can observe concessions the supplier made to their
54 See supra Section I.A.
55 One implication of this point is that practices that lower downstream profits from sales
(such as imposing price ceilings, see supra Section ILE) help the supplier develop a reputation for not
making concessions. Such practices are, therefore, anticompetitive in the above-mentioned sense.
56 This was shown in a formal model by McAfee & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 221.
Yale Journal on Regulation
competitors, the analysis of the supplier's commitment paradox becomes
more complex.57
When downstream firms observe a concession given to their
competitor, they might readjust their pricing strategies accordingly. The
supplier and the downstream firm receiving the concession generally will
anticipate such readjustment, which may change the magnitude of the
concession. In our toy retailer example, suppose the supplier grants a
wholesale price concession to Costco, and both parties know that Toys "R"
Us will be able to observe the concession after it has been granted.
Suppose further that after observing the concession granted to Costco, and
anticipating that Costco consequently will cut its retail price, Toys "R" Us
readjusts its pricing strategy and cuts its own price. Toys "R" Us may react
in such a manner in order to "strike first" and mitigate the harm that
Costco's anticipated price-cut will cause.
5 8
Such a reaction is expected to harm Costco, since by price-cutting
Toys "R" Us steals some business back from Costco. If the supplier and
Costco anticipate Toys "R" Us's reaction, they typically will negotiate a
smaller concession than they would have otherwise. By negotiating a
smaller concession (thereby restricting Costco to a smaller price-cut), they
would mitigate Toys "R" Us's eagerness to cut its price. In such cases, it
can be shown that the eventual wholesale price charged by the supplier
will be somewhat higher than the supplier's marginal cost.
5 9
An opposite effect is expected to occur if an anticipated price-cut by
Costco would make Toys "R" Us extract output or leave the market
altogether (due to reduced profits) rather than cut its price to try to attract
more business.6 ° Under such circumstances, Costco and the supplier would
tend to negotiate an even larger concession than they would have
negotiated but for their anticipation of such a response. A larger
concession would enable Costco to charge an even lower retail price,
which would trigger more extraction of output (or even exit from the
market) by Toys "R" Us and thereby raise Costco's profits even more. In
57 One implication of downstream firms' ability to observe concessions was stated in
Section ID: Observability of concessions is a necessary (though not a sufficient) condition for the
supplier to be able credibly to develop a reputation for not making concessions, thereby avoiding the
commitment paradox.
58 For a formal presentation of this type of competitive interaction among firms (termed in
the industrial organization literature "strategic complements"), see generally TIROLE, supra note 8, at
323-37 and Jeremy Bulow et al., Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements, 93 J.
POL. ECON. 488 (1985).
59 McAfee & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 221.
60 This type of competitive interaction, where one firm becomes more "aggressive" (i.e.,
cuts prices and increases output) and the competing firm raises prices and reduces output in response,
is termed "strategic substitutes" in the industrial organization literature. See generally TIROLE, supra
note 8, at 323-37; Bulow et al., supra note 58.
Vol. 20:25, 2003
Suppliers and Retail Competition
such cases, downstream firms' eagerness to induce their rivals to extract
output exacerbates the commitment paradox.61
Therefore, the supplier and each toy retailer's joint incentive to
negotiate price concessions would still exist, even when concessions to
one toy retailer are observable by the other toy retailers after they have
been given. In our hypothetical, even though Toys "R" Us observes the
concession given to Costco, the concession still grants Costco a
competitive advantage over Toys "R" Us and enables Costco to steal
business from Toys "R" Us. Thus, the same intuition as discussed in
Section L.A provides that the supplier cannot commit to charging the
monopoly wholesale price, unless the supplier credibly can develop a
reputation for not making concessions.62
II. Legal Implications
A. Secondary-Line Price Discrimination
The antitrust prohibition against secondary-line price discrimination
included in Section 1(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act states that,
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person ... either directly or indirectly, to
discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality, . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any
person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
63discrimination, or with customers of either of them ....
Interestingly, this prohibition might help eliminate the commitment
paradox. 64 The courts have interpreted this prohibition to allow an injured
downstream firm to sue the supplier whenever price discrimination put the
injured downstream firm at a competitive disadvantage, making it lose
sales or profits.65 As the Supreme Court in FTC v. Morton Salt Co. put it:
61 McAfee & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 221.
62 See supra Section I.D.
63 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000).
64 O'Brien & Shaffer, supra note 16, construct an economic model that shows how welfare
is reduced by forbidding price discrimination.
65 See Falls City Industries v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428 (1983); J. Truett Payne
Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981), on remand, 670 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1982); FTC v.
Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948); J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1535-38
(3d Cir. 1990); Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980); Mueller Co. v.
FTC, 60 F.T.C. 120 (1962), aff d, 323 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1963); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY 525 (1994); O'Brien & Shaffer, supra note 16. It appears that the supplier cannot
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It is argued that the findings fail to show that [the supplier's]
discriminatory discounts had in fact caused injury to competition ...
[T]he commission found what would appear to be obvious, that the
competitive opportunities of certain merchants were injured when they
had to pay [the supplier] substantially more for their goods than their
competitors had to pay. The findings are adequate.
66
Thus, assuming downstream firms can detect a wholesale price concession
and can prove it in court, the threat of suits based on this statutory
provision would deter the supplier from making concessions. Although the
supplier could approach the complaining downstream firm and offer it a
similar (or even greater) concession, suing the supplier might be more
appealing to the downstream firm since the antitrust laws provide for
treble damages-that is, damages that are triple the actual loss of profit.67
Hence, by helping the supplier resolve the commitment paradox, the ban
on secondary-line price discrimination itself is anticompetitive.
Admittedly, the statutory language supports the courts' interpretation
that it suffices for a plaintiff to show that the injured downstream firm
suffered a competitive disadvantage even if end consumers were not
harmed. The statute's effects clause is satisfied either when competition is
lessened substantially or when "competition with any person who . . .
receives the benefit of such discrimination" might be injured, destroyed, or
prevented. 6' According to this language, even if discrimination might not
"substantially lessen competition," it is still illegal if it might injure
competition between the downstream firm receiving the concession and
other downstream firms. If this potential injury were interpreted as
requiring harm to end consumers, then the first part of the effects clause,
which requires substantial lessening of competition, would be superfluous.
This interpretation is also consistent with the legislative history and
statutory intent surrounding the prohibition of secondary-line price
discrimination. The Supreme Court in Morton Salt quoted the Report of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, "[T]he more immediately important
concern is in injury to the competitor victimized by the discrimination.
Only through such injuries, in fact, can the larger general injury result, and
rebut a claim of price discrimination by claiming that the firm that received the concession, unlike its
rivals, had to pay an additional fixed payment to the supplier. Courts seem to require suppliers to
charge downstream firms similar wholesale prices and similar fixed payments (if fixed payments are
provable in court). O'Brien & Shaffer, supra note 16.
66 334 U.S. at 45-47.
67 Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000), provides that "any person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws ...
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained."
68 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000).
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to catch the weed in the seed will keep it from coming to flower., 69
Similarly, the Court of Appeals in JF. Feeser v. Serv-a-Portion, Inc.,7°
repeating the quotation of the legislative history, stated that "[t]his
statutory language and legislative history are highly persuasive indicia of
Congress' intent to outlaw price discrimination that tends to injure
competitors, rather than competition in general, which we must follow
unless the Supreme Court has construed the statute in a contrary
manner."
71
Unfortunately, this reading of the prohibition of secondary-line price
discrimination harms consumers, since, as shown above, it helps the
supplier resolve the commitment paradox, which in turn causes wholesale
and resale prices to be higher. Furthermore, in a regime without the
prohibition of secondary-line price discrimination, the statutory intent
aimed at protecting downstream firms from suffering a competitive
disadvantage still might be satisfied in many cases. Due to the
commitment paradox, wholesale prices would have been low in the first
place, and downstream firms could not have been disadvantaged. Thus,
removal of the statutory ban on secondary-line price discrimination would,
in many cases, eliminate Congress's worry about downstream firms'
competitive disadvantage and would benefit consumers by leaving the
commitment paradox intact.
Although the prohibition of secondary-line price discrimination helps
the supplier resolve the commitment paradox, it certainly does not
eliminate it. In particular, when wholesale price concessions are not
readily detectable to injured downstream firms, they naturally cannot sue
the supplier on that basis. Furthermore, in order to succeed in such a
lawsuit, injured downstream firms need to prove that a wholesale price
concession has been granted. Wholesale price concessions can be
disguised in many ways, including rebates, improved or discounted
shipping services to the downstream firm's facility, extended credit,
attached gifts, and the like. Downstream firms will not always be able to
present sufficient evidence to show that illegal price discrimination indeed
occurred. Accordingly, downstream firms cannot count on the possibility
of a lawsuit to deter suppliers from making concessions. Therefore, they
will not agree to pay a supra-competitive wholesale price at the outset. In
such a case, the commitment paradox remains intact.
Counter-intuitively, the buyer's liability under Section 1(f) of the
Robinson-Patman Act, which makes it illegal for a buyer "knowingly to
induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited" by the
69 334 U.S. at 49-50 & n.18 (quoting S. REP. NO. 74-1502, at 4 (1936)).
70 909 F.2d 1524 (3d Cir. 1990).
71 Id. at 1533.
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Act, 72 may lessen the statute's effectiveness in solving the commitment
paradox and thereby aid consumers. Buyer liability makes the supplier and
the buyer who received the concession "co-conspirators," so secret
discriminatory deals between them are more obtainable. The following
example illustrates this effect. Suppose the supplier offers retailer A a
wholesale price concession in exchange for a fixed payment. As already
stated, the supplier might do so despite the statutory prohibition, since
retailer B might find it hard to detect discrimination or prove a violation in
court. Still, retailer A would hesitate to pay the fixed payment upfront,
fearing that the supplier would then grant retailer B a concession that
would make a mockery of retailer A's cost advantage. To reassure retailer
A, the supplier would have to agree to receive the fixed payment later,
after retailer A steals business away from retailer B. Absent the liability
imposed on retailer A by the statute, such an arrangement would have been
difficult to implement. Retailer A could have opportunistically refused to
pay the fixed payment, knowing that the supplier could not sue it. Suing
retailer A for failing to pay the fixed payment would expose the supplier's
illegal price discrimination, inviting a treble damages suit from retailer B.
Anticipating retailer A's opportunism, the supplier would refuse to
negotiate the concession in the first place.73 But under Section 2(f) of the
statute, retailer B could likewise sue retailer A for treble damages.
Accordingly, retailer A will hesitate to be opportunistic, and an
arrangement settling the concession will become obtainable. In this sense,
buyer liability erodes the effectiveness of the statutory prohibition and
helps keep the commitment paradox intact. When discriminatory
concessions are provable in court, buyer liability deters buyers from
negotiating such concessions. However, absent buyer liability, most cases
of price discrimination would have been prevented even when they are too
difficult to detect or prove in court, as the supplier's and buyer's above-
mentioned fear of each other's opportunism would tend to deter them from
negotiating concessions.
B. Vertical Integration
Vertical integration between the supplier and a downstream firm will
help eliminate the supplier's commitment paradox. Let us return to the
simple toy retailer example, which includes a monopolistic supplier of
Barbie dolls and two downstream toy retailers-Costco and Toys "R" Us.
In the example, what drove the supplier and Costco's joint incentive to
72 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (2000).
73 To be sure, if the supplier and retailer A expect to negotiate many additional concessions
in the future, retailer A or the supplier might be able to develop a reputation for not being
opportunistic, thereby making concessions feasible.
46
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negotiate a concession in favor of Costco was their disregard of the losses
Toys "R" Us consequently suffered. The supplier's incentives change
dramatically, however, if it vertically integrates with Toys "R" Us. Once
the supplier and Toys "R" Us are one entity, they share all profits and
losses. Under vertical integration, the supplier no longer disregards Toys
"R" Us's losses from a concession to Costco, since the supplier and Toys
"R" Us are a single entity. Vertical integration eliminates the supplier's
commitment paradox.74
Without vertical integration, we have seen that the commitment
paradox might prevent a monopolistic supplier from fully exploiting its
monopolistic position. The supplier's commitment paradox is therefore
beneficial from a welfare perspective. As illustrated in Section L.A,
retailers use the supplier's wholesale price concessions to steal business
from one another by lowering their retail prices.75 Thus, the supplier's
commitment paradox translates directly into lower retail prices, to the
benefit of consumers. In contrast, under vertical integration, the supplier
will be able to exploit its monopoly position completely. It will be able to
commit to producing no more than the monopoly quantity and charging
non-integrated downstream firms the monopoly wholesale price.
The anticompetitive effect of vertical integration identified here
similarly applies to the case of multiple suppliers, discussed in Section I.C.
Suppose the Barbie doll supplier competes with a Cindy doll supplier,
though each of them still possesses some market power. Assume that each
of the suppliers sells through two toy retailers who compete with one
another.76 If the Barbie doll supplier integrates with one of the toy retailers
who sell Barbies, the supplier will no longer have an incentive to grant
wholesale price concessions to the other retailer who sells Barbies, since
74 The supplier's exact behavior following vertical integration may depend on industry
circumstances. In Hart & Tirole's framework, a vertically integrated monopolistic supplier finds it
most profitable to foreclose completely its product from the non-integrated downstream firm. Such
foreclosure will occur whenever supplying the non-integrated downstream firm will sufficiently reduce
the profits of the vertically integrated entity (by depressing the price in the downstream market). See
Hart & Tirole, supra note 9, at 208. Under different assumptions regarding industry circumstances,
where keeping the non-integrated downstream firm operating is beneficial for the vertically integrated
supplier (e.g., due to its low costs or attractive location), the monopolistic supplier may continue
supplying the non-integrated downstream firm, charging it the monopoly wholesale price. In any case,
the basic point made in the text remains strong in different industry configurations: Vertical integration
eliminates the supplier's commitment paradox and enables the supplier to exploit its market power.
75 Note that when the supplier is induced to grant a wholesale price concession, the
downstream firm receiving the concession always cuts 'the resale price as well, to the benefit of
consumers. The downstream firm does not "pocket" all of the wholesale price reduction. If the
downstream firm does not cut the retail price, it cannot steal business from its competitors and cannot
afford to pay the supplier a fixed payment that would induce the supplier to grant the wholesale price
concession. See supra Section I.A.
76 For our purposes, it does not matter whether there are only two retailers, which sell both
Cindys and Barbies, or whether there are two retailers that sell Cindys and two different toy retailers
that sell Barbies.
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the other retailer would then steal business and profits from the Barbie doll
supplier's retailing affiliate. This will restore the Barbie doll supplier's
power to charge a supra-competitive wholesale price. If the Cindy doll
supplier is also vertically integrated with one of the toy retailers selling
Cindy dolls, the Cindy doll supplier too will be able to commit to charging
a supra-competitive wholesale price.77
The analysis is slightly more complex (although the basic conclusions
do not change) if there are more than two downstream firms. Suppose
there are three, instead of two, competing toy retailers-Toys "R" Us,
Costco, and Kaybee Toys. If the Barbie doll supplier integrates with Toys
"R" Us, it still might be induced to grant Costco a concession. Although
such a concession harms Toys "R" Us (which merged with the supplier), it
also harms Kaybee Toys. Since the vertically integrated entity still
disregards the losses to Kaybee Toys, it does not fully internalize the
losses that the wholesale price concession caused. Suppose Costco can
make $600 from the concession by stealing business from Toys "R" Us
and Kaybee Toys, with Toys "R" Us and Kaybee Toys each losing $300.
Costco can offer the supplier a fixed payment of up to $600, which may
leave the supplier better off despite the lower wholesale price and Toys
"R" Us's loss of $300.
Still, since the concession to a non-integrated downstream firm harms
the integrated downstream firm, such a concession becomes less likely in
the case of vertical integration. In particular, vertical integration lowers the
supplier's short-term gain from the concession, thereby facilitating its
ability to develop a reputation for not granting concessions. 8 Furthermore,
in cases where the supplier will find it optimal to sell its product only to its
downstream affiliate,79 the commitment paradox is eliminated completely,
regardless of the number of downstream firms.
77 In fact, the commitment paradox may affect suppliers' choices of whether to integrate
with toy retailers in the first place. In particular, if the type of competition between the suppliers is of
the "strategic complements" type, see TIROLE, supra note 8, at 323-37; Bulow, supra note 58,
suppliers may prefer not to face the commitment paradox in order to commit to charging higher prices,
thereby inducing their rival to charge higher prices as well. To avoid the commitment paradox,
suppliers would prefer to be vertically integrated with a toy retailer. On the other hand, if the type of
competition between the suppliers is of the "strategic substitutes" type, see TIROLE, supra note 8, at
323-37; Bulow, supra note 58, suppliers may, at least for a certain period, prefer to face the
commitment paradox, in order to commit to price cuts and expanded output. Suppliers could thereby
try to induce their rivals to reduce output or leave the market. In such cases, suppliers would, at least
for a certain period, prefer selling to several independent toy retailers, thereby strategically using their
commitment paradox. Cf Kenneth S. Corts & Darwin V. Ncher, Credible Delegation, EUR. ECON.
REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 13, on file with author) (showing how suppliers may strategically
prefer not to be vertically integrated and instead "delegate" pricing decisions to independent
downstream firms in order to commit to becoming more aggressive competitors).
78 See supra Section I.D.
79 See supra note 74.
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The preceding analysis reveals an anticompetitive effect of vertical
integration that neither legal commentary nor the decisions of courts and
agencies have yet acknowledged. A vertical merger helps the supplier
utilize its market power and charge supra-competitive prices, whereas
without the vertical merger the supplier might not have been able to
commit to charging supra-competitive prices.8°
In particular, a large body of legal commentary, often referred to as
the "Chicago School" view, has argued consistently that there is only "one
monopoly profit" the monopolistic supplier can make. According to this
reasoning, even without vertical integration, a monopolistic supplier can
set a monopoly wholesale price that maximizes its profits. Downstream
firms, so the argument goes, will have to set a high resale price that
reflects the monopolistic wholesale price they have to pay for the
supplier's product. Thus, the price charged to end consumers will reflect
the supplier's monopoly position regardless of whether the supplier
integrates with a downstream firm or not.
Indeed, the "one monopoly profit" theory is emphasized in all of the
leading legal analyses of vertical integration as well as in several court and
agency decisions. For example, Richard Posner states:
Imagine an industry with two levels, production and distribution: if
production is monopolized and distribution is competitive, can the
monopolist increase his profits by buying out the distributors? ... If the
producer acquires the distributors and increases the retail markup he will
have to decrease the producer markup by the same amount. He cannot
maximize his profits by charging a price above the monopoly
price .... 81
Areeda & Hovenkamp similarly stress the "one monopoly profit"
claim in their treatise, 82 as do other major authorities.
83 Riordan & Salop, 84
80 In certain cases vertical merger might be prohibited under Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000) (prohibiting acquisitions of "the whole or any part of the stock" or "the whole or
any part of the assets" of another firm where "the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
lessen competition").
81 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 197 (1976); see
also ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 229, 239 (1978).
82 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW I 756b2, at 13 (2d
ed. 2002) ("Under any given cost and demand conditions, there is but one maximum monopoly profit
to be gained from the sale of an end-product.").
83 See, e.g., PHILLIP AREEDA & Louis KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 489 (5th ed. 1997)
("The power already possessed by the ... monopolist to control the price and output ... effectively
controls the price and output of independent [downstream firms]."); Thomas G. Krattenmaker &
Steven C. Salop, Analyzing Anticompetitive Exclusion, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 71, 85 (1987) ("Where the
input supplier is a single-firm monopoly, the supplier often would require no help in exercising
[market] power."). Although Krattenmaker & Salop discuss exceptions to this argument (such as using
vertical integration to evade price regulation), id., they fail to refer to the motivation for vertical
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in a comprehensive analysis of the antitrust treatment of vertical mergers,
also fail to address the anticompetitive effect of vertical integration that is
this Article's focus. For example, they assume that "if a set of spark plugs
is absolutely essential to the construction of an automobile, then a spark
plug monopolist could, in effect, control the automobile market and extract
all the monopoly profits.""5 This presumption ignores the point driving our
analysis, that a monopolistic supplier may be unable to commit to its
monopoly wholesale price and thus may be unable to extract all monopoly
profits.
Several court decisions also cite and apply the "one monopoly profit"
argument. For example, in Western Resources, Inc. v. Surface
Transportation Board,86 electric utilities that transport coal on railroads
challenged a merger between Burlington Northern, Inc. ("BN") and the
Atchinson, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company ("Santa Fe").8" For
several electric utilities, Santa Fe had a monopoly over tracks terminating
at the utility, while there was competition among a few railroads, including
BN, with regard to railroad transportation of coal from the coal mines up
to Santa Fe's lines.88 The Court of Appeals approved the merger, as did the
Interstate Commerce Commission, on the grounds of the "one monopoly
profit" claim. The Court of Appeals stated:
[B]ased on the one-lump theory, which says that there is only one
monopoly profit to be gained from the sale of an end-product or service
(here the transportation of coal for use at an electric generating plant)
[the Commission rejected petitioner's claims]. Because a monopolist at
the end stage of production is in a position to capture that entire profit,
integration backwards upstream, even when accompanied by
monopolization of the earlier stages (which hasn't happened here)
normally does not enable it to raise the profit-maximizing price and thus
inflicts no harm on the ultimate customer.
89
integration identified here, namely, using vertical integration to resolve the commitment paradox. See
also RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 870 (2d ed. 1989) ("There is only one
monopoly profit to be made in a chain of production.").
84 Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post Chicago
Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 513 (1995).
85 Id. at 534; see also id. at 543.
86 109 F.3d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
87 Id. at 783-84.
88 Therefore, the merger between Santa Fe and BN was a vertical merger, in the sense that
BN, in order to provide a utility with transportation of coal from the coal mine to the utility's plant,
needs to acquire the right to use Santa Fe's tracks that reach the plant.
89 109 F.3d at 787. See 4A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
l003a, at 149-50.
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The Court of Appeals failed to take account of the commitment paradox as
an anticompetitive effect of vertical integration. In particular, it failed to
acknowledge that before the merger between BN and Santa Fe, Santa Fe
might have had an incentive to grant concessions to BN and its
competitors due to the commitment paradox. Merger between Santa Fe
and BN might have resolved Santa Fe's commitment paradox, since it
caused the merged entity to internalize some of the losses from
concessions granted to "downstream" railroads. Consequently, the prices
utilities pay for transports might have been substantially higher after the
merger.
Similarly, in Lamoille Valley Railroad Co. v. ICC, the Court of
Appeals stressed that:
Ordinarily, a vertically integrated monopolist has no incentive to use its
monopoly power over one level of production ... to increase profits at
another level . . . . As the leading treatise puts it, 'there is but one
maximum monopoly profit to be gained' from a monopoly of one level
of production, and that profit may be gained directly at the monopolized
level.., through appropriate pricing.
90
The District Court in Turner Broadcasting v. FCC made a similar
argument:
The orthodox thinking on vertical integration by an unregulated
monopoly is that such integration normally adds nothing material to the
distortions implicit in the monopoly itself. A monopoly is able to achieve
a single monopoly profit on its sales, and its ownership of resources
supplying an input normally has no bearing on the extent to which the
price of its final product will exceed the competitive price.
9 1
The "one monopoly profit" theory should properly be read as applying
equally to suppliers with market power short of monopoly power. As we
have seen, according to conventional industrial organization analysis, a
supplier may still possess the power to charge supra-competitive wholesale
prices even though competing suppliers exist.92 According to the "one
monopoly profit" logic, a supplier with market power (even short of
monopoly power) can charge a supra-competitive wholesale price that
maximizes its profits, regardless of whether it is integrated with a
90 711 F.2d 295, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Later in its decision, the court dealt with the
"evasion of price regulation" exception. Id.; see also supra note 83 and accompanying text.
91 910 F. Supp. 734, 774 (D.D.C. 1995). See also Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co.,
915 F.2d 17,23 (1st Cir. 1990).
92 See supra note 10; text accompanying note 45.
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downstream firm that buys its brand. In contrast, our analysis demonstrates
that without vertical integration the supplier (either a monopolist or an
oligopolist) may be unable to commit to charging the supra-competitive
wholesale price that maximizes its profits. Vertical integration with a
downstream firm helps restore the supplier's ability to exploit its market
position.
1. The Reduced Importance of the "Double Marginalization" and
"Input Substitution" Efficiencies
As we have seen, the supplier's commitment paradox reveals an
anticompetitive effect of vertical integration not addressed in legal
commentary and court decisions. The commitment paradox also
substantially lessens the importance of two efficiencies that commentators
and courts commonly allege result from vertical integration.
The first efficiency commonly cited in defense of vertical integration
is the elimination of "double marginalization." 93 This efficiency is based
on the premise that a supplier with market power from either a monopoly
or an oligopoly position will charge a supra-competitive wholesale price
for every unit. According to this argument, downstream firms may also
possess the power to charge a price exceeding their marginal cost.94 These
downstream firms, given the supra-competitive wholesale price they pay
for the product, will add their own markup. The result is an even more
supra-competitive price than that which would be charged by a vertically
integrated firm. Vertical integration tends to reduce the price of the end
product, since it eliminates the "double markup" or so-called "double
marginalization." Once the supplier and a downstream firm are one entity,
the supplier supplies the product to its downstream affiliate for a price
equal to the supplier's marginal cost. Consequently, the price is marked up
only once instead of twice.
The commitment paradox, however, shows that without vertical
integration, the supplier may not be able to commit to charging a supra-
competitive wholesale price. In the extreme case where secret concessions
can be made, the supplier will charge downstream firms a price equal to
the supplier's marginal cost.95 In such a case there will be no "double
markup" even without vertical integration, since the supplier will have no
markup. Even when the wholesale price is not driven all the way down to
93 See, e.g., Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 24; Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843,
861 (6th Cir. 1979); AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 83, at 490-91; Riordan & Salop, supra note 84, at
526 & n.37.
94 See supra note 10.
95 See supra Section I.E.
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the supplier's marginal cost,96 the commitment paradox will cause the
supplier's markup to be smaller than what conventional wisdom
contemplated. Therefore, here too the "double markup" problem is less
important than conventionally thought.
A second commonly cited efficiency of vertical integration is the
input substitution efficiency. 97 This efficiency occurs when downstream
firms use an input supplied by a supplier with market power, together with
other inputs, to produce a new product. When downstream firms can use
varying quantities of the inputs to produce the downstream product, the
optimal mix of inputs used should be determined by the marginal costs of
producing these inputs. For example, it is alleged that when the supplier of
input A possesses market power, it will charge a wholesale price exceeding
the input's marginal cost of production. Therefore, under the assumption
that the other inputs are supplied to the downstream firms for a price equal
to the inputs' marginal costs of production, downstream firms will use an
inefficiently small proportion of input A and an inefficiently large
proportion of the other inputs. Vertical integration allegedly helps
eliminate this inefficient distortion, because once the supplier and a
downstream firm are one entity, the supplier supplies the input to its
downstream affiliate for its marginal cost. The use of the input in the
production of the end product is determined according to the input's
marginal cost, as production efficiency requires.
As with the "elimination of double marginalization" efficiency, the
"input substitution" efficiency is based on the premise that the supplier is
able to charge a supra-competitive wholesale price for its product.
However, the supplier may not be able to commit to charging such a
wholesale price. In extreme cases, the supplier may be obliged to sell the
product for its marginal cost despite its perceived "market power," and
downstream firms will use the input in its efficient proportion (assuming
other inputs are priced at their marginal cost of production). Even without
vertical integration, there would be no inefficient input substitution. When
the supplier is able to charge a wholesale price somewhat higher than the
product's marginal cost, the commitment paradox ensures that the
wholesale price will still be well below the supra-competitive wholesale
price which conventional wisdom anticipates. Consequently, the often-
cited "input substitution" efficiency of vertical integration, like the "double
marginalization" efficiency, is less important than conventionally
perceived.
As shown above, the commitment paradox disappears if downstream
firms buying the supplier's product do not compete with one another due
96 See, for example, some of the cases discussed supra Section I.E.
97 See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 910 F. Supp. 734, 775 (D.D.C. 1995); BORK,
supra note 81, at 229; Riordan & Salop, supra note 84, at 525.
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to price regulation, a downstream cartel, or vertical restraints eliminating
downstream competition. 98 The double marginalization and input
substitution efficiencies still are of less importance. When downstream
firms do not compete with one another, the supplier and downstream firms
generally would prefer to eliminate the supplier's markup by using two-
part tariffs: The supplier will charge its marginal cost per unit while
charging downstream firms a fixed franchise fee to share their profits from
sales.99
In the absence of downstream competition, there will be no problems
of double markup or input substitution, even without vertical integration.
The fixed franchise fee will not adversely affect resale prices or the input
mix, since fixed costs do not affect downstream firms' pricing or
production decisions. If downstream firms buying the supplier's product
do compete, the competition will dissipate overall profits and reduce the
franchise fee downstream firms will be willing to pay. In order to
maximize its profits when the downstream firms compete, the supplier
generally will need to charge a wholesale price above its marginal cost. 0
But then the commitment paradox will cause the supplier to charge a
wholesale price well below its profit-maximizing wholesale price.
Therefore, both the double marginalization efficiency and the input
substitution efficiency are generally much less important than previously
thought. If downstream firms buying the supplier's product compete, the
commitment paradox substantially lessens the importance of these
efficiencies. Conversely, if downstream firms do not compete, these
efficiencies generally become irrelevant because the supplier will want to
eliminate its markup and share downstream profits via a fixed franchise
fee.
C. Operation Through a Sole Outlet
The supplier can also avoid the commitment paradox by selling to
only one downstream firm. Supplying only one downstream firm
eliminates competition among downstream firms that buy the supplier's
product and also eliminates the incentive to grant a concession to one
downstream firm at the expense of another.'0 ' By selling to only one
downstream firm, the supplier can commit to charging its profit-
98 See supra Section I.B.
99 See TIROLE, supra note 8, at 175-76, 184, 187-89. The supplier and downstream firms
will prefer to eliminate the double markup since the double markup inflates the resale price above the
price that maximizes the supplier's and downstream firms' joint profits.
100 Id. at 187-89.
101 See supra Section 1.B (stressing how competition among downstream firms is the driving
force behind the supplier's commitment paradox).
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maximizing (monopolistic) wholesale price or franchise fee, 10 2 and thus
the commitment paradox disappears. 10 3 The same reasoning implies that
selling through a sole outlet also resolves the commitment paradox of an
oligopolistic supplier with market power short of monopoly power.l4
To succeed in eliminating the commitment paradox, the supplier must
be able to commit to sell exclusively to a single downstream firm. In
principle, once the supplier proceeds to operate through a sole outlet, the
supplier has an incentive to break the exclusivity and sell to an additional
downstream firm at the expense of its "exclusive" outlet.105 The second
downstream firm will steal business from the existing one and pay the
supplier a fixed payment as compensation for its encroachment upon the
first downstream firm's exclusivity. This incentive bears some
resemblance to the incentive to grant concessions to existing downstream
firms at the expense of their competitors, described in Section L.A above.
Accordingly, a contractual obligation to grant exclusivity to a
downstream firm benefits the supplier, because it restores the supplier's
ability to extract the total profits from its market position. Without such a
contractual obligation, the "exclusive" downstream firm might not trust the
supplier to refrain from selling to additional downstream firms and thus
might not agree to pay the high wholesale price or franchise fee that would
maximize the supplier's profits. Indeed, there should be more antitrust
concern if the supplier is contractually bound to enforce a downstream
firm's exclusivity than if the supplier is not contractually bound to do
so. 106 Without such a binding contract, the supplier has an incentive
(analogous to the commitment paradox) to encroach upon the downstream
firm's exclusivity and sell to additional downstream firms. The supplier's
opportunistic behavior will tend to lower resale prices. A binding contract
prevents the supplier from encroaching upon the downstream firms'
exclusivity, allowing resale prices to remain high.
102 The supplier can establish a more complex payment schedule, such as a two-part tariff.
When there is no downstream competition, the supplier sells each unit to its exclusive downstream
firm for a price equal to the supplier's marginal cost. It then collects a fixed franchise fee from the
downstream firm to extract all, or part, of the downstream firm's profits. With such a two-part tariff,
the supplier and downstream firms can raise their joint profits while avoiding the problems of "double
marginalization" and "input substitution" discussed supra Section I.B, notes 93-99 and accompanying
text.
103 See McAfee & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 223.
104 The existence of the commitment paradox and its effect on the strategic interaction
among suppliers would then be similar to the case of vertical integration. See supra note 77.
105 See McAfee & Schwartz. supra note 9, at 223 (discussing suppliers' difficulties in
committing not to encroach on downstream firms' exclusivity).
106 See Alexander & Reiffen, supra note 23, at 635-36, 640 (showing that antitrust concern
should be greater when exclusivity can be "externally enforced" by the injured retailer, for example, or
by obligating the supplier to enforce exclusivity). The same point applies to exclusive territories and
minimum rpm arrangements, explored infra Section lI.D.
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Even if the supplier does not contractually commit to maintain the
downstream firm's exclusivity, operation through a sole outlet can still
help the supplier resolve its commitment paradox. Operation through a
sole outlet (like designation of exclusive territories or imposition of a
minimum resale price) helps the supplier develop a reputation for not
making concessions. Alexander & Reiffen neglect this anticompetitive
effect of sole outlets, minimum resale price maintenance, and exclusive
territories. 0 7 These authors argue that the commitment paradox does not
justify prohibition of sole outlets, minimum rpm, and exclusive territories,
since the supplier would not enforce these arrangements unless they
involve efficiencies in distribution. However, they fail to recognize that
these practices facilitate the development of a reputation for not making
concessions. °8
Legal commentary regarding exclusive dealerships and sole outlets
has failed to observe the role of such practices in solving the supplier's
commitment paradox. The proponents of the above-mentioned "one
monopoly profit" claim apply it to the current context as well. According
to their argument, a monopolistic supplier (or a supplier with market
power short of a monopoly) can exploit its market power regardless of the
number of downstream firms through which it operates, since it can always
set a supra-competitive wholesale price that maximizes its profits. For
example, Bork claims that "[w]hen a manufacturer wishes to impose resale
price maintenance or vertical division of reseller markets, or any other
restraint upon the rivalry of resellers, his motive cannot be the restriction
of output. '0 9
This application of the "one monopoly profit" theory again relies on
the incorrect premise that the supplier can exploit its market power even if
it sells to several competing downstream firms. The "one monopoly profit"
argument contradicts the point raised here: When selling to several
competing downstream firms, the supplier may not be able to commit to
charging a supra-competitive wholesale price. Eliminating downstream
competition by operating through a single downstream firm might restore
the supplier's ability to charge a supra-competitive wholesale price or a
franchise fee that would maximize the supplier's profits.
107 Alexander & Reiffen, supra note 23, at 643.
108 Id. at 645. My discussion of minimum rpm and exclusive territories, infra Section lI.D,
will pursue this point in more detail.
109 BORK, supra note 81, at 289. Such arguments were also made with regard to the
analogous case of a vertically integrated monopoly's refusal to deal with non-integrated downstream
firms. See Charles R. Andres, Refusals To Deal by Vertically Integrating Newspaper Monopolists:
Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., II WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 527, 550 & n.170 (1985) (applying the
above-mentioned "one monopoly profit" hypothesis to allege that a refusal to deal with non-integrated
downstream firms will not reduce competition); John Cirace, An Economic Analysis of Antitrust Law's
Natural Monopoly Cases, 88 W. VA. L. REv. 677, 709 & n.197 (1986). See also AREEDA & KAPLOW,
supra note 83, at 612-13, 637-38.
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In their analysis of the sole outlet arrangements under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act,110 courts have consistently shown hostility toward exclusive
dealership agreements when the supplier possessed market power."' The
courts have implicitly assumed that the supplier's "market power" is
exploitable with or without the sole outlet arrangement. Their fear is that
operation through a sole outlet will add to the effects of the supplier's
existing market power through the creation of a monopolistic downstream
firm. Accordingly, the sole outlet arrangement would enlarge the "double
markup": The supplier's markup would be accompanied by the sole
distributor's monopolistic mark up, to the detriment of consumers. Such an
increase in the double markup, however, becomes less of a concern once
we acknowledge that a supplier with market power and a sole outlet will
maximize their profits by eliminating the double markup. As mentioned
earlier," 2 they can do so through a two-part tariff: The supplier would
charge the exclusive downstream firm a price per unit equal to the
supplier's marginal cost, and the downstream firm's profits from sales
would then be divided through a fixed franchise fee.
The anticompetitive effect of sole outlet arrangements identified here
is different. It exists even when the supplier and its sole outlet eliminate
the double markup via a two-part tariff. What the above court decisions
fail to identify is that elimination of downstream competition will not add
to the harm of the supplier's already exploited market power but will
enable the supplier to exploit its market power more fully, which the
commitment paradox previously prevented it from doing.
D. Minimum Resale Price Maintenance and Exclusive Territories
As previously emphasized, eliminating competition among
downstream firms resolves the commitment paradox. The above Section
dealt with elimination of downstream competition in the most extreme
manner, namely operating through a single downstream firm. The current
Section will deal with two other devices the supplier can use to eliminate
downstream competition-minimum rpm and exclusive territories. 13
Minimum rpm refers to a resale price floor imposed on downstream
firms that buy the supplier's product. With a successfully implemented
110 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
Ill See, e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.
1957); PHILLIP AREEDA & Louis KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 657 n.44 (4th ed. 1988).
112 See supra text accompanying note 99.
113 Exclusive territories generally are dealt with under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (2000), and are scrutinized under a rule of reason analysis. See Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Minimum rpm is also scrutinized under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act but is subject to a per se prohibition. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
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minimum rpm arrangement, the supplier and a downstream firm lack a
mutual incentive to negotiate a wholesale price concession. 1 4 Even if a
downstream firm receives a wholesale price concession, it cannot use it to
steal business from its downstream competitors, since it will be unable to
cut its resale price." 5 Accordingly, it cannot offer the supplier a fixed
payment that would make the wholesale price concession worthwhile to
the supplier." 6 If minimum rpm is successfully implemented, the supplier
can restore its ability to charge a supra-competitive wholesale price or
franchise fee" 7 that maximizes its profits." 8
Another way to eliminate downstream competition and restore the
supplier's commitment power is to designate each downstream firm an
exclusive territory or demand segment." 9 Under such an arrangement,
downstream firms do not compete with regard to the sale of the supplier's
brand. Accordingly, as with minimum rpm, when exclusive territories are
effectively implemented, the supplier and downstream firms have no
mutual incentive to negotiate concessions.
As in the case of sole outlets, the supplier must be able to commit to
adhering to the rpm or exclusive territories arrangements in order to
restore its market power. In the absence of such a commitment, once
minimum rpm or exclusive territories arrangements are in place, the
supplier generally will have an incentive to deviate from them. 20 For
example, if a minimum rpm arrangement is made, the supplier might have
an incentive to allow one downstream firm to undercut the price floor at
the expense of other downstream firms in exchange for a fixed payment
from the deviating downstream firm. Conversely, if an exclusive territories
or exclusive market segments arrangement is in place, the supplier might
have an incentive to add downstream firms to an existing downstream
firm's exclusive territory.
114 O'Brien & Shaffer, supra note 9, at 306.
115 It is assumed that downstream firms charge a price that does not exceed the minimum
retail price. If downstream firms charge higher prices, they could still steal business from each other by
undercutting these prices, and the commitment paradox would still exist. Indeed, if the supplier wishes
to avoid the commitment paradox through minimum rpm, the supplier will elect a minimum resale
price high enough to induce downstream firms to charge a price not exceeding the minimum resale
price. Alternatively, the supplier can dictate the resale price and not just a price floor.
116 The analysis applies both to a monopolistic supplier and to the case of an oligopolistic
supplier discussed supra Section L.C and note 77.
117 As emphasized earlier, when downstream competition is eliminated, the supplier
generally will prefer to charge downstream firms a price per unit equal to the supplier's marginal cost
and share the downstream firms' profits from sales through fixed franchise fees. See supra notes 98-99
and accompanying text.
118 The price floor imposed by minimum rpm need not be industry-wide. Suppose there are
multiple (although only a few) suppliers and that each supplier possesses market power (see supra
Section I.C). Even in such a case, all a supplier needs in order to overcome its commitment paradox is
to impose a price floor on downstream firms buying the supplier's brand.
119 See O'Brien & Shaffer, supra note 9, at 305.
120 See Alexander & Reiffen, supra note 23, at 634.
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The supplier will, of course, benefit from successfully committing to
enforce the minimum rpm or exclusive territories arrangements (either
contractually or through development of a reputation for enforcing such
arrangements). It will help alleviate the commitment paradox and restore
the supplier's market power. Therefore, as with the case of sole outlets,
minimum rpm and exclusive territories arrangements are potentially more
anticompetitive when the supplier is contractually bound to enforce
them.12 Empirically, however, minimum rpm, sole outlet, and exclusive
territories arrangements usually do not contractually bind the supplier to
enforce them.1
22
From the preceding analysis, Alexander & Reiffen deduce that to
prevent suppliers from using minimum rpm, exclusive territories, and sole
outlet arrangements to resolve the commitment paradox, courts need not
forbid these practices. All courts need to do, so the argument goes, is
refrain from making the supplier enforce these practices (pursuant, say, to
a complaint from an injured downstream firm). As Alexander & Reiffen
put it:
[Antitrust] laws are not required to keep bilateral minimum RPM and
exclusive territory contracts from being used [to resolve the commitment
paradox]. Rather, a passive regime of nonintervention by the courts-
e.g., denying retailer A the right to enforce price and/or territorial
restrictions imposed by the manufacturer on retailer B-can be sufficient
to prevent minimum RPM and exclusive territory contracts from being
used to [resolve the commitment paradox].
23
Alexander & Reiffen continue to argue that if the supplier voluntarily
enforces these arrangements, it probably does so because the arrangements
facilitate efficient distribution of the supplier's product, which is good for
consumers. 24 What Alexander & Reiffen fail to address, however, is that
even without a contractual commitment to enforcing minimum rpm,
exclusive territories, and sole outlet arrangements, these practices can aid
the supplier in developing a reputation for not making concessions.
Without using these practices, it will be harder for the supplier to develop
such a reputation. A wholesale price concession, in and of itself, usually is
hard to detect, and at best, downstream firms detect it with a lag. As stated
in Section I.D above, this hinders the supplier's ability to develop a
reputation for not making concessions. On the other hand, deviation from a
minimum rpm, exclusive territories, or sole outlet arrangement is very easy
121 Id. at 635-36.
122 Id. at 636-42.
123 Id. at 636.
124 Id. at 645.
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to detect quickly. Accordingly, the supplier may develop a reputation for
enforcing these arrangements much more easily than for not making
concessions without these arrangements. Once the supplier develops a
reputation for enforcing these arrangements, downstream competition is
eliminated, and the supplier will not be induced to grant concessions.
Even if the supplier enforces minimum rpm, exclusive territories, or
sole outlet arrangements due to the distribution efficiencies they foster,
such arrangements should not necessarily be legal per se. Their
anticompetitive harm in helping to resolve the commitment paradox still
might outweigh their distribution efficiencies. Ironically, it is these
arrangements' efficiencies in distribution that might cause them to resolve
the commitment paradox. Such efficiencies induce the supplier to enforce
minimum rpm and exclusive territories, thereby enabling the supplier to
commit credibly to not making concessions.
As with vertical integration and sole outlets, legal commentary and
decision-making have failed to address this anticompetitive effect of
minimum rpm and exclusive territories. A large body of the legal
commentary suggests that minimum rpm and exclusive territories do not
have anticompetitive effects. Such arguments are based on the above-
mentioned "one monopoly profit" claim, leading commentators to presume
that the supplier is able to charge a supra-competitive wholesale price that
maximizes its profits regardless of the level of downstream competition.
Thus, so the argument goes, suppression of downstream competition
through the imposition of minimum rpm or exclusive territories would just
harm the supplier, unless such restriction of downstream competition
produces efficiencies in distribution that offset the harm to the supplier.
Marvel, for example, argues that "manufacturers will not voluntarily
enforce cartels for their dealers":
[A] manufacturer has no more interest in inefficient distribution than do
consumers .... Higher mark ups [for retailers] mean that the net-of-
margin demand curve faced by the manufacturer is lower than need be.
Lower demand curves are less profitable. If retailer price competition is
suppressed, the manufacturer must anticipate some benefit to offset the
adverse effects of the higher dealer margins that result. 1
25
Other leading sources reach similar conclusions.
126
125 Howard P. Marvel, The Resale Price Maintenance Controversy: Beyond the
Conventional Wisdom, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 59, 81-82 (1994). For a similar argument, see BORK, supra
note 81, at 289, 290.
126 See, e.g., AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 83, at 612-13 ("Ordinarily, a manufacturer will
maximize its profits by selling wholesale at a price satisfactory to itself and by encouraging maximum
competition among dealers in order that their profit margins might be as low as possible .... ");
POSNER, supra note 81, at 147; Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason,
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Marvel's argument is based on his presumption that the supplier can
commit to its profit-maximizing wholesale price, regardless of the level of
downstream competition. The supplier, so the argument goes, can exploit
its market power by setting its profit-maximizing wholesale price and
allowing competition among downstream firms to lower downstream
firms' profit margins as much as possible. By elevating downstream firms'
markups, minimum rpm only harms the supplier (unless minimum rpm
also produces offsetting efficiencies in distribution), since it lowers the
demand for the supplier's product more than is optimal for the supplier.
Marvel's argument does not take into account the possibility that the
supplier may not be able to commit to charging its profit-maximizing
wholesale price due to the commitment paradox and that minimum rpm (as
well as exclusive territories) can resolve the commitment paradox.
E. Maximum Resale Price Maintenance
The supplier can also avoid its commitment paradox by imposing
resale price ceilings on downstream firms (maximum rpm) while
eliminating downstream profits from sales, as O'Brien & Shaffer 127 and
Alexander & Reiffen show. 128 To do this, the supplier must keep wholesale
prices sufficiently close to the resale price ceiling so as to allow
downstream firms to recover their resale costs and leave them with zero
profits from sales. As shown in Section L.A above, if downstream firms do
not make profits from sales, the commitment paradox disappears.
As stressed earlier, however, it is highly unlikely that the supplier will
wish to leave downstream firms with zero profits from sales. Furthermore,
for the supplier to eliminate downstream firms' profits from sales, it must
know downstream firms' cost structure, which in many cases is not
feasible. This considerably weakens O'Brien & Shaffer and Alexander &
Reiffen's reasoning. Maximum rpm arrangements that are not coupled
with elimination of downstream profits cannot, in and of themselves,
resolve the commitment paradox. Once downstream firms make profits
from sales, the commitment paradox arises: The supplier might not be able
to commit to charging supra-competitive wholesale prices, and resale
prices will drop well below the maximum resale price. O'Brien & Shaffer
and Alexander & Reiffen's claim is relevant only in rare cases, where the
evidence shows that downstream profits from sales were eliminated.
53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135 (1984); Marvel, supra note 125, at 61; Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the
Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution-Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981); Lester
G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960). The same sort of
reasoning is present in most of the economic literature. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 8, at 678; F.W.
Taussig, Price Maintenance, 6 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS) 170 (1916).
127 See O'Brien & Shaffer, supra note 9, at 305.
128 See Alexander & Reiffen, supra note 23, at 632.
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The economic and legal literature, however, fails to articulate a more
subtle anticompetitive effect of maximum rpm. Even if the supplier does
not eliminate downstream profits from sales, it might be able to constrain
them. The supplier could impose a price ceiling, for example, and charge
downstream firms relatively high royalties or wholesale prices that, given
the resale price ceiling, will tend to reduce downstream profits from sales.
Such behavior seems more realistic than total elimination of downstream
profits. It does not require more than a rough estimation of downstream
firms' cost structure, and it leaves downstream firms with some profits
from sales, keeping their promotional incentives intact. Although the
commitment paradox generally exists even for small downstream profits,
the lower the downstream profits, the better the supplier's chance of
developing a reputation for not making concessions. Constraining
downstream firms' profits from sales (even without eliminating them)
lowers the supplier's short-term profit from granting a concession, thereby
facilitating the development of a reputation for not making concessions.
1 29
The lower downstream profits from sales are, the lower are the profits that
can be stolen through a concession granted to a downstream firm, and the
smaller is the supplier's potential gain from the concession.
Under the thirty-two-year-old Albrecht v. Herald Co."3° rule,
maximum rpm traditionally has been considered a per se violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.1 31 More recently, however, the U.S.
Supreme Court in State Oil Co. v. Khan overruled the per se rule in
Albrecht and held maximum rpm to be subject to a rule of reason
analysis. 32
The anticompetitive effect of maximum rpm identified above, namely
its use in solving the commitment paradox, does not necessarily contradict
the ruling in Khan. The fear that maximum rpm might help suppliers
develop a reputation for not making concessions does not justify a per se
prohibition, since as Part I emphasized, the commitment paradox might not
exist in certain industries or cases depending upon the industries'
characteristics. Accordingly, a rule of reason approach is indeed
appropriate. Still, the Supreme Court's reasoning shows that it was
unaware of the anticompetitive effect identified here. In particular, the
Court implied that maximum rpm tends to reduce resale prices. As the
Court stated:
"Low prices," we have explained, "benefit consumers regardless of how
those prices are set, and so long as they are above predatory levels, they
129 See supra Section I.D.
130 390 U.S. 145(1968).
131 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
132 522 U.S. 3, 17 (1997).
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do not threaten competition." [Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum
Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990).] Our interpretation of the Sherman Act
also incorporates the notion that condemnation of practices resulting in
lower prices to consumers is "especially costly" because "cutting prices
in order to increase business often is the very essence of competition."
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594
(1986). So informed, we find it difficult to maintain that vertically-
imposed maximum prices could harm consumers or competition to the
extent necessary to justify their per se invalidation.
133
The Court cited several authorities, all of whom presume that
maximum rpm is bound to reduce resale prices. For example, the Court
quoted Judge Posner's ruling in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals'
decision in the same case making the following point:
As for maximum resale price fixing, unless the supplier is a monopsonist
he cannot squeeze his dealers' margins below a competitive level; the
attempt to do so would just drive the dealers into the arms of a competing
supplier. A supplier might, however, fix a maximum resale price in order
to prevent his dealers from exploiting a monopoly position.'34
The Supreme Court quoted Bork making a similar claim: "There could, of
course, be no anticonsumer effect from [maximum rpm as considered in
Albrecht], and one suspects that the [newspaper] has a legitimate interest
in keeping subscriber prices down in order to increase circulation and
maximize revenues from advertising. '  Indeed,, maximum rpm could
have the effect of reducing resale prices by trimming downstream firms'
mark ups. However, both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in
Khan overlooked the point made above-that maximum rpm might cause
resale prices to rise. Both courts and the literature they rely upon presume
that even without maximum rpm, the supplier can charge supra-
competitive wholesale prices that reflect its market position. Our analysis,
though, implies that maximum rpm can alleviate the commitment paradox,
which is important for future rule of reason examinations of maximum
rpm.
F. Tying
A tie-in is "a sale or lease of one product or service on the condition
that the buyer take a second product or service [from the same supplier] as
133 Id. at 15.
134 Id. at 15-16 (quoting Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1362 (7th Cir. 1996)).
135 Id. at 16 (quoting BORK, supra note 81, at 281-82).
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well. ,1 3 6 It can help the supplier develop a reputation for not making
concessions. The supplier can tie the sale of a product for which
development of a reputation for not making concessions is easier to the
sale of a product for which development of such a reputation is more
difficult. That is, the tie-in enables the supplier to use "slack" reputation
ability in connection to one product to develop a reputation in connection
to another more problematic product.
37
Tie-ins are scrutinized mainly under Section 1 of the Sherman Act'1
8
and Section 3 of the Clayton Act. 139 The economics and legal literature has
put forward a multitude of explanations, both anticompetitive and
efficiency-oriented, for why suppliers use tie-ins and what their effects are
on welfare. 40 The Microsoft case, in which a federal district court found
that Microsoft unlawfully tied its Windows operating system to its
Explorer browser, is a striking example of tying and its importance in
antitrust policy.'
4'
This Article presents a new anticompetitive explanation for why
many suppliers are interested in tie-ins or equivalent practices. As shown
in Section I.D above, the supplier is interested in developing a reputation
for not making concessions but cannot always succeed in doing so.
Characteristics that hinder a supplier's ability to develop such a reputation
might exist in connection to one product the supplier supplies but not in
connection to another product.
For example, one of the supplier's products might involve low
downstream profits from sales, while another might yield relatively high
downstream profits from sales. As pointed out in Section I.D above, the
lower the downstream profits from sales, the smaller the supplier's short-
term profits from making concessions and the stronger its ability to
develop a reputation for not making concessions. If, for instance,
136 HOVENKAMP, supra note 65, at 351.
137 Bemheim & Whinston, supra note 30, promoted a similar idea in the different context of
cartels between competitors that compete in several markets.
138 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
139 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2000) ("It shall be unlawful for any person ... to . . . make a sale or
contract for sale of goods ... on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the ... purchaser...
shall not use or deal in the goods ... of a competitor ... of the ... seller, where the effect . . . may be
to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.").
140 See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 65, at 366-81; Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly
Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 515 (1985); Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure,
and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837 (1990).
141 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000); United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 41-56 (D.D.C. 2000); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F.
Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999). The court of appeals recently held that "the rule of reason, rather than per se
analysis, should govern the legality of tying arrangements involving platform software products."
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
This Article suggests that an additional anticompetitive effect of tying, overlooked by the
previous literature and case law, should be factored into such a rule of reason analysis even in
arrangements involving platform software products, such as the one discussed in the Microsoft case.
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downstream firms make relatively high profits from selling modems and
relatively low profits from selling PCs, a supplier that supplies both
modems and PCs might not be able to develop a reputation with regard to
modems but could easily do so with regard to PCs.
Suppose now that the supplier ties the sale of its PCs to the sale of its
modems. The supplier might now be able to develop a reputation for not
making concessions on the modems as well. Since under the tie-in retailers
buy both modems and PCs from the supplier, if the supplier makes a
concession on modems, retailers could then retaliate (e.g., refuse to pay
more than the supplier's marginal costs) not only in connection with
modems but also in connection with PCs. Since retaliation in connection
with PCs would substantially harm the supplier, its deterrent effect might
be enough to keep the supplier from making concessions for either PCs or
modems.
The tie-in enables the supplier to use its "slack" reputation in the sale
of PCs to help develop a reputation for not making concessions in the sale
of modems. Now the supplier will be able to commit to charging a supra-
competitive price for modems. Without the tie-in, retailers buying the
supplier's modems might not have bought the supplier's PCs. The
supplier's difficulty in developing a reputation for not granting
concessions in connection with modems would have remained.
Consequently, modems' wholesale and resale prices would be
considerably lower with than without the tie-in. 142
To give another hypothetical, different products the supplier produces
might face fluctuating demand. One product might experience a boom in
demand in a certain season, while the other might face low demand in the
same season. In a different season, the reverse could be the case. When
demand for a product is high, the supplier's urge to make a concession is
stronger than its urge to do so when demand is low, because during a
boom in demand the supplier's short-term gain from making a concession
is relatively high. 143 For instance, if the supplier sells only product A to
142 To be sure, if concessions on modems are profitable enough, and retaliation with regard
to PCs is lenient enough, the tie-in might have the opposite effect of inducing the supplier to make
concessions on PCs. The supplier knows that if it grants concessions on modems, retailers will retaliate
in connection with PCs anyway. Hence, the supplier might as well make concessions on its PCs.
However, if the tie-in's motivation is to alleviate the commitment paradox, the supplier will refrain
from using it where it hinders its reputation with regard to PCs. Only if the tie-in is driven by other
motivations which are so profit-enhancing that they are worth sacrificing the supplier's reputation with
regard to PCs will this point be of policy importance. In such unlikely cases, the supplier will use the
tie-in notwithstanding the collapse of its reputation with regard to PCs. Courts might be able to identify
such cases by observing that: a) concessions on one of the products (modems in our example) are
extremely profitable; b) retaliation with regard to the other product (PCs in our example) is relatively
lenient; and c) the tie-in is driven by strong motivations other than solving the commitment paradox.
143 Julio J. Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Business Cycles
and Price Wars During Booms, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 390 (1986), make this point for the case of cartels
among competitors. Bemheim & Whinston, supra note 30, at 8-9, apply the fluctuating demand case to
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certain retailers and only product B to others, it might be unable to develop
a reputation for not making concessions during booms in demand for the
product in question. However, if the supplier ties the sale of product A to
the sale of product B, which faces booms in demand when product A faces
declines in demand and vice versa, it might succeed in developing a
reputation for not granting concessions with regard to both products.
Retailers could retaliate by agreeing, for example, to pay no more than the
supplier's marginal cost in future periods with regard to product A and
product B. Therefore the supplier faces increased harm from granting a
concession for product A when product A faces booms in demand.
Similarly, such a tie-in can help the supplier develop a reputation for not
granting concessions with regard to product B when product B faces
booms in demand and product A faces declines in demand.1
44
The preceding paragraphs imply that tying might be anticompetitive
for reasons other than those discussed in the legal and economics literature
or in the case law. One popular objection to tying results from the fear that
a firm dominant in one market might use tying to gain dominance in
another.145 Our analysis implies that the supplier need not be dominant
with regard to any of its products for tying to be anticompetitive. As
shown in Section I.C above, even suppliers that compete with other
suppliers and are not dominant in their markets might face the
commitment paradox, as long as they are conventionally considered to
possess some market power. Moreover, our analysis suggests that tying
might be anticompetitive even if there is no fear that tying will exclude
competing suppliers from the tied product's market. 1
46
Thus both the economics and legal literature as well as the case law
fail to identify this anticompetitive effect of tying. The usual presumption
is that the supplier can charge a supra-competitive price that maximizes its
profits either with or without tying. Here too the above-mentioned "one
monopoly profit" claim has been advanced abundantly, causing
commentators to promote a lenient antitrust approach to tying. 147 For
example, Posner states that:
their analysis of cartels among competitors that compete in several markets.
144 Fluctuations in demand for the supplier's tied products need not have a perfectly negative
correlation for the tie-in to help the supplier develop a reputation. It suffices if fluctuations in demand
for the products are not perfectly correlated. Bemheim & Whinston, supra note 30, at 9-10, make this
point with regard to the case of cartels among competitors that compete in several markets.
145 See, e.g., Whinston, supra note 140.
146 Indeed, in order to resolve the commitment paradox, the tie-in need not forbid or deter
downstream firms from purchasing competing products.
147 Courts have been reluctant to accept the "one monopoly profit" theory in connection with
tying, unlike vertical integration and vertical restraints. This stems from their fear that a firm with
market power in the "tying" product might be able and willing to exclude its competitors in the "tied"
product. As Kaplow, supra note 140, and Whinston, supra note 140, show, economics and game
theoretic models support this fear in certain circumstances. The preceding paragraphs suggest that
courts should fear tying for an additional reason-tying aids the supplier in resolving its commitment
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[A fatal] weakness of the leverage theory is its inability to explain why a
firm with a monopoly of one product would want to monopolize
complementary products as well. . . If the price of the tied product is
higher than the purchaser would have had to pay in the open market, the
difference will represent an increase in the price of the final product or
service to him, and he will demand less ... of the tying product.
1 48
Similarly, Blair & Finci conclude that "[g]enerally, the purpose [of tying]
is not to monopolize or control another market. Instead, the purpose is to
use whatever market power currently exists more effectively. This, of
course, is sensible because there is only one monopoly profit to be
extracted."
1 49
In contrast, this Article reveals how tying can alleviate the
commitment paradox, thereby increasing resale prices in one of the tied-in
products. Without tying, the supplier might have been unable to develop a
reputation for not making concessions in connection with one of its
products. The commitment paradox might have dissipated the supplier's
market power with regard to that product, causing its resale prices to be
lower.
G. Most-Favored-Customer Clauses
The supplier can use "most-favored-customer clauses" to help
alleviate the commitment paradox. Most-favored-customer clauses provide
that if a supplier grants a concession to one downstream firm, it must do so
for all downstream firms. Such clauses are widely used and have raised the
interest of scholars in a variety of contexts. For example, some have
argued that most-favored-customer clauses might facilitate cartels or
supra-competitive pricing among competing suppliers.1 50  Our focus,
though, is on a different anticompetitive effect of most-favored-customer
clauses. These clauses can be used to resolve the commitment paradox,
paradox-even when there is no threat of exclusion in the tied product's market.
148 POSNER, supra note 81, at 173.
149 Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey Finci, The Individual Coercion Doctrine and "lying
Arrangements: An Economic Analysis, 10 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 531, 554 (1983). See also Charles F.
Rule, Patent-Antitrust Policy: Looking Back and Ahead, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 729, 731 (1991) ("[T]here
is only a single monopoly price for any given product, and you can either sell that product alone or you
can combine it with as many complements as you want, but you are only going to be able to earn that
one monopoly profit.").
150 See, e.g., TIROLE, supra note 8, at 330-32; Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical Restraints with
Horizontal Consequences: Competitive Effects of "Most-Favored-Customer" Clauses, 64 ANTITRUST
L.J. 517 (1996); Thomas E. Cooper, Most-Favored-Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion, 17 RAND
J. ECON. 377 (1986); Aaron S. Edlin, Do Guaranteed-Low-Price Policies Guarantee High Prices, and
Can Antitrust Rise to the Challenge?, Ill HARV. L. REV. 528, 555 (1997).
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thereby restoring the supplier's market power. Assuming a concession is
observable to downstream firms and can be proven in court, a supplier
constrained by a most-favored-customer clause will not have an incentive
to grant wholesale price concessions in the first place. Were the supplier to
grant a concession, the downstream firm receiving it would be unable to
steal business away from competing downstream firms, since they too will
have received similar concessions. Therefore, a downstream firm will be
unwilling to pay the supplier a fixed payment that would make the
concession worthwhile to the supplier. The supplier will be deterred from
granting a concession to only one downstream firm, since the other
downstream firms would sue the supplier for not obeying the most-
favored-customer clause.
McAfee & Schwartz claim that most-favored-customer clauses are
not always effective in solving the commitment paradox.151 In their formal
model, downstream firms pay the supplier a fixed franchise fee and a
wholesale price per unit. If one downstream firm receives a wholesale
price concession, it pays the supplier a higher franchise fee than it
expected to pay before the concession. In McAfee & Schwartz's
framework, once a downstream firm receives a wholesale price concession
(and pays a higher fixed fee), other downstream firms care more about
their fixed fee and care less about the wholesale price they pay per unit.,
5 1
Thus, they might not exercise their option under the most-favored-
customer clause to receive the same contract (i.e., a lower wholesale price
and a higher fixed fee) as the downstream firm that received the
concession. Accordingly, McAfee & Schwartz argue that the most-
favored-customer clause will not be effective, since injured downstream
firms will not take advantage of it.15 3 McAfee & Schwartz's results,
however, are true only if the particular most-favored-customer clause
promises the same combination of wholesale price and franchise fee to all
downstream firms. The most-favored-customer clause could provide, for
instance, that if one downstream firm receives a wholesale price
concession, other downstream firms receive their competitor's reduced
wholesale price without adjusting the franchise fee upward. This would
remove downstream firms' possible reluctance to exercise their option,
thereby restoring the clause's effectiveness in solving the commitment
paradox.1
5 4
151 McAfee & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 215-18.
152 Id. at217.
153 Id. at 217-18.
154 Most-favored-customer clauses are generally more effective in solving the commitment
paradox than the statutory ban on secondary-line price discrimination, analyzed supra Section II.A. A
most-favored-customer clause can be defined broadly, capturing any wholesale price differential, while
the statutory ban is subject to certain hurdles the plaintiff must overcome, such as proof of competitive
injury. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 65, at 523-25.
68
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For most-favored-customer clauses to be effective, however,
competing downstream firms must be able to observe concessions to each
downstream firm and be able to prove the existence of these concessions in
court. As mentioned above, in many cases a concession to a downstream
firm is not observable. 55 Even if downstream firms can deduce that a
concession has been granted to their competitor, in many cases proving so
in court will be difficult.
Nevertheless, several devices could plausibly assist downstream firms
in observing the supplier's price concessions to other downstream firms.
The supplier may agree to have an independent accounting firm audit its
books and invoices, either regularly or according to a random draw.1 56 The
results would be made accessible to downstream firms at will. The supplier
may want to implement such a practice because it can enable the supplier
to commit to a supra-competitive wholesale price. Our analysis implies
that such practices might be anticompetitive, since they help resolve the
supplier's commitment paradox. Accordingly, courts and agencies should
be able to scrutinize contracts that make wholesale price concessions
observable to downstream firms and provable in court.' 57 Section 1 of the
Sherman Actt18 can serve as a statutory tool for scrutinizing most-favored-
customer clauses and agreements that make the supplier's concessions
more transparent to downstream firms. Alternatively, the Federal Trade
Commission may be able to scrutinize such contracts under Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, which condemns "unfair methods of
competition."
159
H. The Commitment Paradox as a "Probability Result"
Some might argue that, since the supplier's commitment paradox is a
"probability result," we should exercise caution before using the
commitment paradox as a basis for making policy decisions. 16° One could
base such an argument on the claim, for example, that the commitment
paradox depends upon the beliefs downstream firms hold regarding the
155 See supra Section I.D.
156 As stated in the Introduction, supra note 31, General Electric adopted such a practice,
coupled with a most-favored-customer clause, in 1963.
157 Such devices can alleviate the commitment paradox even absent most-favored-customer
clauses. By making concessions immediately observable, they improve the supplier's ability to develop
a reputation for not making concessions. See supra Section I.D.
158 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
159 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2000). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in E.I Du Pont
De Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984), however, did not hold that most-favored-
customer clauses violate Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, despite the Federal Trade
Commission's claim that such clauses might facilitate cartels.
160 For criticism of this nature, although not in the context of the commitment paradox, see
Michael W. Klass & Michael A. Salinger, Do New Theories of Vertical Foreclosure Provide Sound
Guidance for Consent Agreements in Vertical Merger Cases?, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 667 (1995).
Yale Journal on Regulation
wholesale prices paid by their competitors. 61 Moreover, one could claim
that the alleged anticompetitive effect of vertical integration, tying, and
vertical restraints is probabilistic because the supplier, in certain cases,
could develop a reputation for not making concessions without using
vertical integration, tying, or vertical restraints.
62
But such an argument should not be taken too far. Historically,
antitrust law and policy has not hesitated to show hostility toward certain
practices, even though the anticompetitive effects of these practices are
uncertain and probabilistic. A striking example is the antitrust treatment of
horizontal mergers. To condemn a horizontal merger through Section 7 of
the Clayton Act,' 63 the antitrust merger provision, a plaintiff need only
show probable anticompetitive effects. 164 Keeping this well-known
doctrine in mind, the probabilistic nature of the commitment paradox
becomes less troubling.
In particular, if the industry in which a horizontal merger occurs is
concentrated (e.g., it consists of only a few large firms), the legal rule
tends to condemn the merger as anticompetitive.' 65 The economic
reasoning behind this legal rule rests mainly on two expected
anticompetitive effects of horizontal mergers in concentrated industries.
166
The first is the increased probability of tacit collusion among the firms
remaining in the industry after the merger. The term "tacit collusion"
refers to a situation in which firms charge a cartel-like price even without
communicating, because each firm fears that its price-cut will trigger a
price war that will harm the price-cutting firm in the long run. Second,
courts and agencies may fear that greater concentration in the post-merger
market will allow firms to exercise more market power and to charge an
even higher supra-competitive price than before the merger. 67 This may
occur even without "tacit collusion" in the industry. Conventional
industrial organization analysis expects firms to charge prices even higher
161 See supra note 12.
162 See supra Section I.D.
163 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000) (prohibiting acquisitions of"the whole or any part of the stock" or
"the whole or any part of the assets" of another firm where "the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition ....").
164 See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967) ("[Section 7 of the Clayton
Act] can deal only with probabilities, not with certainties .... And there is certainly no requirement
that the anticompetitive power manifest itself in anticompetitive action before § 7 can be called into
play. If the enforcement of § 7 turned on the existence of actual anticompetitive practices, the
congressional policy of thwarting such practices in their incipiency would be frustrated."). See also
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323, 343, 346 (1962); United States v. E.I. Du Pont
De Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957); Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 1368, 1378-
79 (9th Cir. 1978); AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 83, at 802.
165 See cases and source cited supra note 164; U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade
Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (Sept. 10, 1992).
166 U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, supra note 165.
167 Id.
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above their marginal costs after a horizontal merger that reduces the
number of firms in the market.1
68
However, at least the former of these feared effects of horizontal
mergers is probabilistic in nature. The possibility of tacit collusion, even
with very few firms in the market, is probabilistic for two main reasons.
First, even after the merger, tacit collusion may not be sustainable in the
industry, because firms' urge to cut the price below the collusive price
might be too great. 69 Second, even when tacit collusion is sustainable,
formal models predict that the industry's equilibrium price may still be
competitive. 170 Nevertheless, courts and agencies seldom hesitate to
condemn or attack a merger based on this probabilistic fear, even in cases
where the second feared effect of horizontal mergers-increased market
power-is insignificant.'
71
Analogously, even though the commitment paradox focused upon
here is probabilistic, we can still draw policy implications from it. Along
with other theories of vertical integration and vertical restraints, it should
be used to evaluate the probable anticompetitive effect of these practices.
Conclusion
The supplier's commitment paradox enhances consumer welfare and
overall welfare at the expense of suppliers, since it erodes suppliers' ability
to earn supra-competitive profits. Unfortunately, several factors aid
suppliers in their inevitable attempts to regain market power. Congress
unintentionally created one such form of assistance with the statutory
prohibition of secondary-line price discrimination. Still, buyer liability
mitigates the effects of this statutory prohibition and thus fuels suppliers'
urge to make concessions. In vertical integration and vertical restraints,
suppliers have found additional measures that help resolve their
168 See TIROLE, supra note 8, at 283 (showing how when there is competition between firms
selling differentiated products, the smaller the number of firms, the higher the price).
169 See id. at 245-47. Moreover, it would be extremely difficult for an antitrust court or
agency to distinguish between an oligopoly in which tacit collusion is sustainable and an oligopoly in
which it is not. Among other characteristics, such a distinction requires that the court or agency know
how important future earnings are to each firm (so as to deter the firm from triggering a price war),
what the gains from price-cutting would be, and what the price-cutters' expected losses would be from
a price war. See id. at 272-73 (showing, in a formal model, how tacit collusion is sustainable only
under conditions requiring information about the above parameters).
170 Only if we continue to assume that firms somehow coordinate a supra-competitive price
can we infer that oligopolistic "tacit collusion" is indeed anticompetitive. See id. at 245-47, 253. Such
coordination, however, may be infeasible, since explicit contact regarding a collusive price is subject
to antitrust prosecution, making tacit coordination difficult. For cases in which such coordination
problems are especially acute, see id. at 250-51.
171 The fear of increased market power would not be significant in industries where products
are homogenous (i.e., different firms' products do not differ from one another in the eyes of
consumers), and there are no capacity constraints. In such industries, firms usually do not possess
market power, no matter how concentrated the industry is. See, e.g., id. at 209-24.
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commitment paradox. Suppliers can overcome the commitment paradox
and restore their market power through integration with a downstream
firm, minimum resale price maintenance, exclusive distribution, exclusive
territories, maximum resale price maintenance, tying, and most-favored-
customer clauses. The commitment paradox, therefore, exposes an
anticompetitive effect that these practices have and that legal scholars,
courts, and antitrust agencies should consider.
Appendix
O'Brien & Shaffer's"' formal result can be illustrated as follows.
When the supplier and a retailer (say, retailer B) negotiate the wholesale
price, they will maximize their joint profits, which can be written as
follows:
Supplier's and retailer B's joint profits =
(supplier's, retailer A 's, and retailer B's joint profits) - (retailer A's
profits)
To find the wholesale price that maximizes the supplier's and retailer
B's joint profits, we need to calculate the derivative of these joint profits
with respect to the wholesale price B pays. This derivative can be written
as:
The derivative of the supplier's and retailer B 's joint profits =
(the derivative of the supplier's, retailer A 's, and retailer B's joint
profits) - (the derivative of retailer A 's profits)
We shall look at the value of this derivative when B pays the
monopoly wholesale price. If the value is negative, we know that the
supplier and retailer B will not choose the monopoly wholesale price but
rather a smaller wholesale price. When the derivative with respect to the
wholesale price is negative, joint profits rise as the wholesale price
diminishes. That is, a wholesale price concession would raise the
supplier's and retailer B's joint profits. Indeed, under quite general
assumptions, the derivative is negative. At the monopoly wholesale price,
the derivative of the term:
(supplier's, retailer A 's, and retailer B "s joint profits)
is zero. In industrial organization analysis, the "monopoly" wholesale
172 O'Brien & Shaffer, supra note 9.
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price-which maximizes the supplier's profits from sales-is the
wholesale price which maximizes the supplier's and both retailers' joint
profits.1 73 This is because the supplier can share the retailers' expected
profits through franchise fees that retailers pay the supplier. Accordingly,
the derivative of this expression with respect to the wholesale price at the
wholesale price that maximizes the expression ("the monopoly wholesale
price") is, by definition of the maximum, zero. It suffices to show that the
derivative of retailer A's profits with respect to the wholesale price that
retailer B pays is positive, since a negative sign precedes the derivative.
This is easily shown. Retailer A's profits are always a positive function of
the wholesale price retailer B has to pay, and hence their derivative is
positive unless retailer A makes zero profits, in which case his profits are
not affected by the wholesale price retailer B has to pay. Accordingly, the
supplier will not charge retailer B the monopoly wholesale price, but
instead they will negotiate a concession.
Put in algebraic terms, denote the supplier's profit as T, , retailer A's
profit as ;7A, retailer B's profit as 7r, and the wholesale price retailer B is
charged PB. Since at the monopoly wholesale price ( rs + 7r A + )B 0,a(psq)
and since aQ rs + rB) - O(7rs + r A + ;,9 - 7rA) -O(s + 7CA + )B A) , and
a(pB) o P a(pB) 9(PB)
given that 0 (r.A) >0, it follows that at the monopoly wholesale price
a(pB)
a(7rs +7rB) <0, meaning that the supplier and retailer B would want to
a(PB)
negotiate a concession.
Furthermore, O'Brien & Shaffer show how for every wholesale price
above the supplier's marginal cost, the supplier would have a similar
incentive to negotiate a small wholesale price concession. To illustrate, let
us portray O'Brien & Shaffer's formal model in more detail for the case of
a monopolistic supplier selling to two retailers who compete over end
consumers. Consider a two-stage game. In the first stage, the supplier and
each retailer agree on a supply contract. In the second stage, retailers, who
are differentiated from one another, engage in price competition. Denote pi
as retailer i's retail price, qi as the quantity sold by retailer i, and i as
retailer i's total transfer to the supplier (where i = 1,2). T is a function of qi
(that is, retailer i's payment to the supplier is a function of the retailer's
actual sales). Consumers' demand for retailer i's sales is a negative and
173 See, e.g., id at 302; G F. Mathewson & R A. Winter, An Economic Theoty of Vertical
Restraints, 15 RAND J. ECON 27 (1984).
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differentiable function of pi. The supplier's costs, C(ql+q2), are
differentiable, increasing, and convex. Retailers' costs (other than their
transfer to the supplier) are assumed, without loss of generality, a to be
zero. Each retailer i maximizes its profits:
maxp piqi - Ti
The first order condition is:
q, +(p -T') =- (iP,1,2) (1)
When selecting T the supplier and each retailer will maximize their joint
profits:
Maxp, piqi + Tj - C(q, + q2) (i-J, J=l2) 
175
Solving the first order conditions and substituting equation (1) gives:
9q, (T-'-C ',-(T 2'-C') = 0 (for the supplier and retailer 1) (2)
a5P, 9P,
and
aq, (T'-C') + 0-q-2 (T2'-C') = 0 (for the supplier and retailer 2). (3)
OP2 9P2
Adding equation (2) to equation (3) results in:
(aq2 + aq2)( 2' C ) '  q, . q,,,,,.,
+ )(2 - C)-- + -)T- C) = 0 . (4)
ap, OP2  aP2 aP1
-+ a- and -' + q,- are negative under the conventional assumptionap , ap I ap 2 ap ,
that demand for a retailer's product is more sensitive to its own price than
174 The fact that retailers have equal costs does not harm the generality of the analysis, since
retailers are possibly asymmetrically differentiated. Thus, for example, one retailer might be more
profitable than the other due to its ability to charge a higher retail price.
175 For simplicity, maximization is portrayed with regard to the retail price. This does not
harm the generality of the analysis, since for every wholesale price negotiated with a retailer, there is
an accompanying retail price the retailer will correspondingly charge.
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to a rival retailer's price. Furthermore, T'-C' and T,'-C' are not negative,
since otherwise the supplier would make negative marginal profits from
selling to a retailer. Therefore, according to (4) it must be true that:
T2'= C and T, '= C'. That is, retailers' marginal transfer to the supplier
equals the supplier's marginal cost.

